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THE Texas Legislature extensively amended the Texas Workmen's Com-
pensation Act in 1973,1 but few of the changes have been reflected in
reported appellate opinions during the last two survey years.2  Next year
should bring a great deal of appellate writing on most of these amendments.
During this survey year the legislature again amended the Act, but these
changes are not as extensive as the radical surgery performed in 1973. In
addition, there was one opinion overturning established law and pronouncing
new compensation law, as well as other interesting judicial rulings further
analyzing established concepts. These amendments, both legislative and
judicial, will significantly affect workmen's compensation practice and de-
serve observation and analysis.
I. STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
The Sixty-Fourth Legislature adopted eight amendments to the Work-
men's Compensation Act.3 Three of these are of general interest while the
remainder are of limited importance. 4  Article 8309, section la,5 allowing
elective workmen's compensation coverage for partners, sole proprietors, and
corporate executive officers, has been amended also to provide elective
coverage for real estate salesmen compensated solely by commissions. 6
A controversial procedural problem was remedied by the legislature with
the adoption of article 8307d. 7 This article provides for nonsuit of an
appeal from an Industrial Accident Board award any time before the jury
retires for deliberation, but only after notice to all parties and a hearing. It
*B.B.A., LL.B., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas.
1. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306, 8307, 8309 (Supp. 1975-76).
2. Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
183 (1975).
3. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 10, art. 8307d, art. 8309, § la, art.
8309h, §§ 3-5 (Supp. 1975-76); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.76(c) (Supp. 1975-76); ch.
55, [1975] Tex. Laws 119 (1976 Appropriations Bill).
4. Ch. 55, [1975] Tex. Laws 119 (appropriations to the attorney general for op-
erating expenses and claim payments to state officers and employees covered by work-
men's compensation pursuant to TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309g (Supp. 1975-
76)); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309h, § 3 (Supp. 1975-76) (providing workmen's
compensation coverage for employees of political subdivisions); id. § 4 (allowing a joint
fund by two or more political subdivisions for payment of workmen's compensation
claims and exempting the fund from regulation by the State Board of Insurance); id.
§ 5 (providing an offset against compensation payments for payment of any other dis-
ability benefits payable to employees of a political subdivision); TEx. INS. CODE ANN.
art. 5.76(c) (Supp. 1975-76) (providing assigned risks coverage for any risk under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act and/or the Federal Coal Mine Health Safety Act of 1969).
5. Ch. 88, [1973] Tex. Laws 194, as amended, Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
8309, § la (Supp. 1975-76).
6. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § la (Supp. 1975-76).
7. Id. art. 8307d.
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is further provided that such nonsuit shall not prejudice the right of an
adverse party to assert a claim for affirmative relief.
The controversy over the right to nonsuit in compensation cases existed
primarily when the carrier appealed the Board's award and attempted to
nonsuit the action when the claimant filed an answer without asserting a
counterclaim. Under such circumstances a nonsuit resulted in the complete
extinction of the claimant's cause of action against the carrier because of the
well-established principle that the mere filing of suit completely vacates the
Board's award as to the parties to the suit.8 Thus, after the carrier
nonsuited the cause of action, the Board's award was vacated and unenforce-
able, the time limit for perfecting appeal by the claimant was exhausted, the
claimant had no pleading upon which any affirmative relief could be
granted, and, therefore, the claim for compensation was effectively terminat-
ed.9 Such result emphasized form over substance and was a trap for the
unwary even though it was technically correct. With the passage of article
8307d, however, each party should now have his day in court.
Prehearing conferences were first authorized by the legislature in 1969.10
The statute simply provided for the mandatory use of prehearing conferences
and prehearing officers for "the purpose of adjusting and settling claims for
compensation."" Other than providing the Board with the authority to
promulgate "procedural rules and regulations . . . to govern such prehearing
conferences, ' 12 the legislature has remained aloof not only from the smolder-
ing controversy surrounding the efficiency with which such conferences are
conducted but also from the sometimes partisan nature of the prehearing
officers. While the prehearing conference has undoubtedly contributed
greatly to the speedy and equitable disposition of compensation claims, 13 it
has been subject to abuse by over-zealous individuals who were not required
to account for their actions or recommendations. Effective September 1,
1975, however, all prehearing officers are required to prepare a report to the
Board on cases not settled at the prehearing conference, stating not only the
officer's recommendation but also the basis for such recommendation.' 4
Moreover, contrary to prior procedure, the officer is required to furnish
copies of the recommendation and justification to all interested parties, and
the association is to forward a copy to the subscriber.' 5 Thereafter, all
parties, except unrepresented claimants, must file a formal statement with
8. See, e.g., Latham v. Security Ins. Co., 491 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. 1972); Texas Re-
ciprocal Ins. Ass'n v. Leger, 128 Tex. 319, 97 S.W.2d 677 (1936); Zurich Gen. Accident
& Liab. Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 128 Tex. 313, 97 S.W.2d 674 (1936).
9. See Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Clark, 360 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1962, writ dism'd), distinguishing Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Reed, 138 Tex. 271,
158 S.W.2d 767 (1942).
10. Ch. 18, § 9, [1969] Tex. Laws 52, as amended, TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
8307, § 10 (Supp. 1975-76).
11. Ch. 18, § 9, [1969] Tex. Laws 52.
12. Id.
13. Boykin, The Texas Industrial Accident Board: An Insider's Point of View, 9
TRIAL LAw. F., Jan.-March 1975, at 5; Salomon, The Pre-Hearing Conference in Work-
men's Compensation, 9 TRIAL LAw. F., Oct.-Dec. 1974, at 11.




the Board, as in the past, but the statement must now include a point-by-
point reply to the prehearing officer's recommendations.' 6 In compliance
with the amended statute the Board has adopted a printed form for use by
prehearing officers in making their recommendations. This form does not
appear to be entirely satisfactory insofar as the justification for the recom-
mendation is concerned because the form does not require a narrative
exposition. It is suggested that a narrative statement of the reasons justify-
ing the recommended award would enable the parties to refute or enlarge
specifically on critical points of law or evidence, thereby enabling the Board
members to weigh all sides of the controversy and arrive at an informed
decision. 17
II. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Industrial Accident Board Rule-Making Power. The rule-making power of
the Industrial Accident Board is limited in comparison to other state
agencies. 18 The Board's rule-making power is found in article 8307, section
4 which provides: "The Board may make rules not inconsistent with this law
for carrying out and enforcing its provisions."' 19 This power is not frequent-
ly challenged, but as noted in a recent opinion by the 'Beaumont court of
civil appeals 20 inferentially involving the Board's power, "[r]ules promulgat-
ed by the Industrial Accident Board have fared poorly in the courts."' 21 The
Beaumont court's opinion involved a non-profit corporation, Industrial Foun-
dation of the South, which sought to tie into the Board's computer system
and extract certain items of information on every claim for workmen's
compensation filed by Texas employees. The Foundation alleged it was
16. Id.
17. Two minor amendments by deletion also occurred in the amendment of art.
8307, § 10. In the second sentence of § (b) in the prior article, the Board was specifi-
cally authorized to direct "the parties; [sic] their attorneys or the duly authorized agents
of the parties" to attend prehearing conferences. Amended § (b) now provides that the
Board may only direct "the parties" to appear for prehearing conferences.
Also in § (b) the language providing that facts developed in prehearing conferences
could not be used in any proceedings before the Board or elsewhere has been changed.
The following language has been deleted: "[facts developed in a prehearing conference
may not be used] [b]efore the Board, or elsewhere in a contested case where the facts
involved therein or in any one of them is sought to be contradicted by the association,
employee or the subscriber." In its place is the simplified phrase: "except before the
Board." This deletion and substitution, however, does not appear to change the purpose
and intent of the article.
18. See, e.g., the Railroad Commission, which exercises power delegated by the con-
stitution and statutes, Texarkana & Ft. S. Ry. v. Houston Gas & Fuel Co., 121 Tex. 594,
51 S.W.2d 284 (1932); the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, which exercises
police power delegated by statute, Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Attic Club, Inc., 457
S.W.2d 41 (Tex.), appeal dism'd, 400 U.S. 986 (1970).
19. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4 (1967). The Board is also granted
limited rule-making power to govern pre-hearing conferences. Id. § 10(b) (Supp. 1975-
76): "The Board shall promulgate procedural rules and regulations not inconsistent with
this law to govern such pre-hearing conferences and provided further, such rules and reg-
ulations shall not affect nor change any substantive portion of this law."
20. Texas Indus. Accident Bd. v. Industrial Foundation of the South, 526 S.W.2d
211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ filed).
21. Id. at 219. See also Jackson v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 471 S.W,2d 450
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Kelley v. Indus. Accident Bd., 358
S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, writ ref'd); Burton v. I.C.T. Ins. Co., 304
S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, no writ).
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engaged in gathering information on compensation claimants for dissemina-
tion to its numerous members (various employers of workmen) in order to
evaluate a prospective employee's past job injuries before determining his
capacity to perform a given task. This information was sought under the
provisions of the Texas Open Records Act.22  The trial court ordered the
Board to permit copying of the information. The court of civil appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court on grounds not relevant to this
discussion, but, in so doing, it reviewed the Board's contention that the
Foundation was not entitled to the information because of the provisions of
Board rule 9.040 denying access to prior compensation claim records except
under restricted circumstances, and then only to designated individuals and
companies. 23 It was the Board's contention that the rule had the force and
effect of law, relying on language to that effect in Clawson v. Texas
Employers' Insurance Ass'n24 and Galacia v. Texas Employers' Insurance
Ass'n.2 5  As cogently noted by the Beaumont court, Clawson and Galacia
"'were severely wounded by Chief Justice Calvert's repudiation of the basic
holding in each case. '26 In overruling the Board's contention, the court
pointed out that rule 9.040 did not appear to have any foundation in the
compensation statute, and in fact, the Board had not pointed to any statutory
foundation.2 7
While the court's commentary concerning the lack of authority for the
Board rule is clearly dictum, the discussion points up the fact that several
Board rules now in effect appear to be subject to the same criticism. For
example, rule 8.140,28 although ambiguous in its language and apparent
application, appears to provide that no compromise settlement agreement
will be approved by the Board for an amount less than the maximum weekly
compensation rate in effect at the time of injury. This rule appears to
contravene the legislative method provided to compute the monetary recov-
22. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Supp. 1975-76). See generally Com-
ment, Texas Open Records Act: Law Enforcement Agencies' Investigatory Records, 29
Sw. L.J. 431 (1975).
23. TEX. INDUS. ACCIDENT BD. RULES 9.040 (1974):
As a prerequisite for approval of a request for a record check or for the
furnishing of information on a claimant, there must be a workmen's com-
pensation claim for the named claimant open or pending before this Board
or on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction from the Board at the
time the record search request or request for information is presented to
this Board. . . . The Board will furnish the requested information or a
record check only to the following: (1) the claimant; (2) the attorney
for the claimant; (3) the carrier; (4) the employer at the time of the cur-
rent injury; (5) third-party litigants.
24. 469 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971) (citing
Galacia v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), as its sole authority), a!f'd, 475 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1972).
25. 348 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. 526 S.W.2d at 219, citing Clawson v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 475 S.W.2d
735 (Tex. 1972).
27. In fact, TEX. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 9 (1967), appears to be com-
pletely contrary to the Board's position: "Upon the written request and payment of the
fees therefor . . . the board shall furnish to any person entitled thereto a certified copy
of any order, award, decision or paper on file in the office of said board .
28. TEx. INDUS. ACCIDENT BD. RULES 8.140 (1974).
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cry in compensation cases29 which is tied to the claimant's wage rate. The
establishment of wage rate is an integral part of the statutory scheme with
the burden of proof on the claimant.30  Thus, over the years the issue of
wage rate, especially as it affects the compensation rate during periods of
partial incapacity, has generated a substantial amount of litigation 8l simply
because it provides an avenue by which a carrier's ultimate dollar liability
can be greatly reduced. Without any statutory authority, the Board's rule
has simply provided that all claimants will receive the same compensation in
all compromise settlement situations, contrary to article 8307, section 12.82
The Board has also adopted rules for the calculation of vision and hearing
loss. 3 There is, however, no statutory authority for such rules. Rule
11.03384 provides that the costs of medical reports required by statute to be
filed by a treating physician 35 will be paid by the carrier. The justification
set out in the rule is that the charge will be considered a "necessary expense
in the reasonable care of the injured workman." 36  The medical services
statute,8 7 however, simply states that the association shall provide medical
aid, chiropractic services, hospital and nursing services, and medicines as
may be required to cure and relieve the effects naturally resulting from the
injury. It further provides that the physician rendering services to a
claimant shall render reports concerning the nature and extent of the injury
to the Board, the association, and the claimant. Failure to make reports can
relieve the association and the claimant from any obligation to pay for such
services. The statute does not speak to the issue of payment for a narrative
or any other kind of medical report. It can only be assumed, therefore, that
the legislature did not intend that such reports be rendered for a fee. The
Board's justification for the rule fails to find support in the explicit wording
of the statute, since such reports obviously are not included in the listed
services to which a claimant is entitled. Nor can support for the rule be
found in article 8306, section 7b 38 which allows the Board to regulate fees
and charges allowed by section 7. Regulation by the Board is limited to
those services for which section 7 allows a charge to be made, i.e., medical
29. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 8306, §§ 10, 11, 12 (Supp. 1975-76); id. art.
8309, § 1(1967).
30. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Shannon, 462 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1970);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ford, 153 Tex. 470, 271 S.W.2d 397 (1954).
31. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 400 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1966);
Griffin v. Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195, 338 S.W.2d 415 (1960); Southern Underwrit-
ers v. Schoolcraft, 138 Tex. 323, 158 S.W.2d 991 (1942); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n
v. McMahon, 509 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Smith, 469 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sides, 403 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12 (1967): "Where the liability of the
association or the extent of the injury of the employ6 is uncertain, indefinite or incapable
of being satisfactorily established, the board may approve any compromise, adjustment,
settlement or commutation thereof made between the parties."
33. TEX. INDus. ACCiDENT BD. RULES 8.070, 8.080 (1974).
34. Id. 11.033.
35. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Supp. 1975-76).
36. TEX. INDUS. AccIDENT BD. RULES 11.033 (1974).
37. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Supp. 1975-76).
38. Id. § 7b (1967).
1976]
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aid, chiropractic, hospital, and nursing services, medicines, and rehabilitation
services.
Suicide. A workman's willful attempt to injure himself is theoretically
excluded as a compensable injury.39 In 1943 the Texas Supreme Court
announced an exception to the general rule as it applied to suicide in Jones
v. Traders & General Insurance Co. 40 Although suicide was considered to
be an independent agency breaking the causal connection between injury
and death, the court ruled that compensation would be allowed since the
insanity producing the suicide was so violent as to cause the employee to
take his life through uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium or frenzy. 41 This
exception became known as the uncontrollable impulse theory of recovery, 42
and remained viable until this survey year when the supreme court departed
from Jones and adopted a different theory of recovery in workmen's
compensation suicide cases43 as well as in negligence suicide cases. 44
In the compensation case, Saunders v. Texas Employers' Insurance
Ass'n, the employee sustained a compensable back injury, subsequently
undergoing an unsuccessful lumbar laminectomy complicated by thrombo-
phlebitis. After months of apparently intractable pain, the employee took his
life through a self-inflicted shotgun wound. Expert testimony established
that the combination of drugs taken by the employee could cause depression
and give rise to strong suicidal impulses in susceptible individuals. The
majority of the court of civil appeals 45 applied the Jones uncontrollable
impulse rule, holding there was no evidence raising the issue of delirium or
frenzy and, therefore, reversed and rendered judgment for the carrier. The
concurring opinion46 argued for review of Jones in light of present scientific
knowledge of drugs and human behavior.
The supreme court reviewed the history of the Jones rule, emphasizing the
two components of the rule, i.e., uncontrollable impulse and lack of knowl-
edge of the physical consequences of the act (uncontrollable impulse evi-
denced by a delirium or frenzy). In rejecting the rule, the court correctly
pointed out that the strict application of the delirium or frenzy element, as
applied in other jurisdictions, had been severely criticized and finally
abandoned. 47 In fact, the Jones rule had become the minority position. 48
Thus, the supreme court abandoned Jones, holding in favor of a new theory
of compensation. Over-simplified, this theory asks if the proximate cause of
the death was the chain of events initiated by the injury suffered in the
39. Id. art. 8309, § 1.
40. 140Tex. 599, 169 S.W.2d 160 (1943).
41. Id. at 602-03, 169 S.W.2d at 162.
42. See 1A A. I-ARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 36.10-.21
(1973); Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 616 (1967).
43. Saunders v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 526 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1975), noted
in 54 TEXAS L. REV. 180 (1975).
44. Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 526 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. 1975).
45. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Saunders, 516 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974) (majority opinion), reviewed in Sartwelle, supra note 2, at
225-26.
46. 516 S.W.2d at 245.
47. 526 S.W.2d at 517, citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions.
48. See 1A A. LARSON, supra note 42, § 36.22; Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 616 (1967).
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course and scope of the employee's employment. 49 As explained by the
supreme court in Saunders, the newly adopted theory is concerned with:
[W]hether an uncontrollable impulse resulted from an impairment
of the workman's reasoning facilities which would cause the suicidal
act to be an involuntary one.
The essential question then becomes what criteria are to be followed
in reaching the ultimate conclusion as to whether or not the record
establishes sufficient mental derangement, causally related to the ori-
ginal injury .... [W]e believe that in cases where the effects of injuries
suffered by the deceased result in his becoming dominated by a de-
rangement of the mind which impairs the ability to resist the impulse
to take his own life to the extent that the decedent was in fact unable
,to control it, the suicide cannot be termed as willful under Article 8306,
[sic] §1. °
Applying the theory to the facts developed in Saunders, the court held that
the expert testimony established that the suicidal act was the result of a drug-
induced mental derangement which impaired the employee's ability to resist
the uncontrollable impulse to kill himself. Since the testimony further
established that the mental derangement arose out of the "effects" (drug
treatment) of a compensable injury, the suicide would not be willful as
contemplated by the statute. Thus, the judgment of the lower court was
reversed, but because of the new theory adopted by the court, the case was
remanded for a new trial in the interest of justice.51
As always, the difficulty arises in the application of real world facts to the
esoteric theory. Although great strides have been made in understanding
the complex workings of the human psyche as well as the effects of drugs on
human behavior, few would contend that man's knowledge concerning these
subjects even remotely approaches a predictable science. This lack of
definitive knowledge has created controversy in other jurisdictions as to both
the kind and the degree of mental derangement which will convert suicide
into a compensable injury.52 The Texas court, however, has indicated its
willingness to allow evidence of any type of derangement, organic or
psychogenic, whether induced by trauma, disease, drug therapy, or other
causes, as long as the result is a dominating derangement of the mind which
impairs the ability to resist the suicidal impulse to the extent that the
employee is unable to control the impulse. 53 The key to recovery, then, is
expert testimony establishing that the employee was compelled to do what he
did by the circumstances of the injury or its treatment (uncontrollable
impulse). The conjecture and speculation that will be engendered by this
requirement, however, may result in excessively strained interpretations of
the testimony, as occurred in Saunders.
A review of the expert testimony quoted in both the supreme court's
49. 1A A. LARSON, supra note 47, § 36.30.
50. 526 S.W.2d at 517-18 (emphasis added).
51. ld. at 519.
52. See 1A A. LARSON, supra note 42, § 36.22.
53. 526 S.W.2d at 517-18.
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opinion 54 and the majority opinion of the court of civil appeals 5 reveals the
total absence of any direct testimony that the employee was uncontrollably
compelled to commit suicide. The most that can be gleaned from the expert
testimony is that the continuing problems resulting from the injury may have
caused the employee's depression which may have been aggravated by the
prescribed drugs, resulting in a distortion of his values and value judgments.
This testimony may satisfy the requirement of mental derangement but it
certainly does not provide evidence of the required uncontrollable impulse
which obviates the statutory prohibition against willful injuries. It appears
that the only evidence of uncontrollable impulse in Saunders was supplied by
the court's statement to that effect. If the supreme court was intent on
changing the suicide rule, perhaps it should have adopted the simpler and
more realistic chain of causation theory argued by Justice Coulson in his
concurring opinion in the civil appeals court: 56
At and before his death, Saunders was under the influence of . . .
drugs which, when combined, induced mental depression, and altered
his normal mental processes in a manner which impaired his normal
good judgment. The combination of the pain resulting from his injury,
together with the prescribed medication, so impaired his thought pro-
cesses that he did a tragic thing in taking his life. The evidence would
justify a conclusion that Saunders would not have committed that final
act but for the injury suffered . . . the consequential pain and suffer-
ing, and the medical treatment made necessary as a result of such injury.
Curiously, a second suicide case reached the supreme court during this
survey year. In Gregory v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n"7 the carrier
was unable to produce direct evidence of suicide but did produce over-
whelming circumstantial evidence. Even so, a Brazoria County jury ren-
dered a verdict in favor of the beneficiaries, but the court of civil appeals
held, as a matter of law, that the evidence conclusively established that the
employee's death resulted from self-inflicted injuries.58 The supreme court,
however, straining as in Saunders, reversed the judgment of the court of civil
appeals and remanded the case for consideration of other points of error.59
The evidence recited by the supreme court revealed that the employee
jumped or fell from a 43-foot building on his employer's premises. An eye-
witness saw the employee approximately midway in the fal. The body
maintained the same configuration until it hit the ground 20 feet from the
edge of the building. The carrier's expert testimony established that a body
striking the ground 20 feet from the edge of a 43-foot building would have
had to leave the roof at a horizontal speed of 9.15 miles per hour. The
evidence also revealed the existence of a stairway on the side of the building
with various fixtures extending above the stairway platform which was
54. ld. at 518.
55. 516 S.W.2d at 243-44.
56. Id. at 245 (Coulson, J., concurring).
57. 530 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1975).
58. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Gregory, 521 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1975).
59. 530 S.W.2d at 108.
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located approximately 25 feet above the ground and extended six feet, seven
inches from the side of the building. The beneficiaries contended that rather
than running off the building the employee fell and struck some part of the
stairway which caused the body to ricochet or deflect in an outward
direction. This, they contended, accounted for the fact that the body landed
20 feet from the edge of the building. The supreme court recognized its
previous opinions holding that circumstantial evidence alone can conclusively
establish an ultimate fact"0 but held that it would be unreasonable to
conclude, as a matter of law, that the employee intentionally jumped from
the building, since it was possible that he fell and struck a portion of the
stairway.
In order to obtain the full flavor of the supreme court's strained interpre-
tation of the few facts recited in its opinion, it is necessary to review the full
recitation of the evidence in the court of civil appeals opinion. 61 In addition
to the meager facts recited by the supreme court, the evidence revealed that
the injury occurred during the employee's lunch break and that the employ-
ee's duties did not require his presence on or near the roof of the building
where the incident occurred. Moreover, the eyewitness first saw the body
when it was above the stairway platform, and the feet were pointed outward
from the building and the head was higher than the feet at an angle of
approximately 30 degrees. The body remained in this configuration until it
hit the ground. More importantly, photographs taken after the accident
showed that the light fixtures extending above the stairway platform were
undamaged, except for one of three light bulbs which may have been
broken. The court of civil appeals realistically recognized that the benefici-
aries' theory that the body struck the light fixtures and was propelled outward
to the point where it landed was unacceptable because:
The body would have had to be propelled outward to strike the light
fixture [6' 7" according to the undisputed evidence]. It is most im-
probable that the resistence from hitting the light bulb and its breaking
would have exerted sufficient force to propel the body outward to
such a distance that the head hit thirteen or fourteen feet from the
vertical of the light fixture. The eye witness testified that the body fell
without any turning or tumbling motion.62
Moreover, there was undisputed evidence concerning the employee's two
previous attempts to commit suicide. Co-employees also testified that the
deceased exhibited depressive symptoms and very poor work habits for a
number of weeks prior to his death and had become withdrawn, uncommuni-
cative, irritable, and depressed all of the time. As the court of civil appeals
said, no reasonable conclusion could be drawn from the evidence other than
the fact that the employee willfully and intentionally injured himself.63
However, in view of the supreme court's liberal and strained interpretations
60. Id. at 106, citing Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Krayer, 366 S.W.2d 779
(Tex. 1963), and Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 235 S.W.2d 972 (1951).
61. 521 S.W.2d at 900-02.
62. Id. at 900.
63. Id. at 902.
1976]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
in Saunders and Gregory, it appears evident that an assault on the intention-
al injury exclusion has begun and will undoubtedly be completed within a
short time.
Specific Injuries-Extend to and Affect. The supreme court wrote two
opinions on the "extend-to-and-affect" doctrine in specific injury cases
during the last survey year. One case defies explanation based on past
judicial principles and the other reaffirms long-established precepts applica-
ble to specific injury cases.
In Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Gonzales6 4 the employee cut his left
hand, severing tendons in his middle finger. After medical treatment,
including several operations, the finger was amputated. Prior to the ampu-
tation, the employee experienced difficulty with the movement of his injured
hand, arm, and elbow, and was given various medications, including injec-
tions of a drug described as attenuated cobra venom. These injections
caused generalized edema of the left arm, preventing further injections at
that site. Subsequent injections were administered in the legs. Soon after
the initial leg injections, the claimant became severely i1l and suffered
complete paralysis for two weeks. 'Following the paralysis, the employee
experienced severe low back pain, numbness of the lower extremities, and a
severe antalgic gait requiring the use of a back brace and a cane. The jury
found that the injury to the left hand extended to and affected the claimant's
body, and the court of civil appeals affirmed the total and permanent verdict
in spite of apparently valid objections to the special issues.6 5 The supreme
court first noted that the evidence adequately supported the jury's total-
permanent finding. The only serious question was whether there was any
evidence to support the jury finding that the injury to the left hand extended
to and affected the body generally.
-In affirming the lower court judgments, the supreme court was primarily
concerned with the sufficiency of the medical testimony connecting the hand
injury to the other numerous parts of the claimant's body. The claimant's
expert witness was unable to explain the anatomical reasons for the claim-
ant's disability as it progressed from his hand to other parts of his body:
"The doctor stated that his opinion was not 'based on medical probability'
because '[m]edically speaking, you couldn't account for it.' This is to say,
just how the cut on the hand or the three operations or the shock therapy or
the injections . . . or either of these, caused the present condition[s]
"6
Undaunted by the ineptitude of the medical testimony, the court sought to
dignify the conclusions offered as medical evidence by stating:67
This Court has never required that the medical expert explain or
even understand the precise ,biochemistry or mechanism by which the
64. 518 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. 1975) (Greenhill, C.J., dissenting), aff'g 506 S.W.2d 303
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974), reviewed in Sartwelle, supra note 2, at 210-11.
65. 506 S.W.2d at 307; Sartwelle, supra note 2, at 210-11 nn.178-81 and accompany-
ing text.
66. 518 S.W.2d at 527 (emphasis by the court).
67. Id. at 527-28 (emphasis added).
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initial trauma affects the health or organs of the injured party.
The record reveals an uninterrupted and increasingly debilitating se-
quence of events which had its genesis in the initial injury to the hand.
The origin and cause of the physical consequences resulting in the gen-
eral injuries have no other explanation in this record.
The testimony of Dr. Miller [claimant's expert], along with the fact
that there was an uninterrupted chain of events leading from the spe-
cific injury to general injuries, is sufficient to support the jury finding
that the injury to the left hand . . . extended to and affected his body
generally.
Considering the court's conclusion in light of established specific injury
principles leaves considerable doubt as to whether the court has adopted a
"chain of causation" theory for extension of specific injuries to general
injuries. The medical testimony, in spite of the court's attempt to boot-strap
it into credibility, completely failed to connect the effects of the original
injury to the general disability as has been required in the past.0 8
Less than three months after Gonzales the court again wrote an opinion in
a specific injury case but rejected a claim of general disability similar to the
claim made in Gonzales. In Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Wilson69
a 60-year-old oil field worker was struck in the right eye with a piece of
chain. The injury resulted in the surgical removal of the eye. The carrier
admitted liability for the eye, but the claimant sought general disability
based on an alleged traumatic neurosis caused by the injury. The expert
testimony established that the claimant suffered generalized disability result-
ing from a variety of factors, including anxiety over the loss of his eye, loss
of his ability to secure employment and work with only one eye, as well as
anxiety over the lawsuit.
The jury found that the disability was not limited to the claimant's eye,
but that the injury did not extend to and affect the claimant's body thereby
causing incapacity to the body generally.70 The court of civil appeals held
these answers to be in irreconcilable conflict, but the supreme court held that
the jury's answers supported a judgment for the specific injury only, revers-
ing the lower court judgments and rendering judgment for the specific injury.
The court correctly noted that the answer to the first special issue only
established that the claimant sustained general disability but did not consti-
tute a finding that the injury was the cause of the general disability. The
jury's answer to the second special issue indicated that the claimant failed in
his burden to secure a finding that the original injury extended to and
affected other parts of the body. The claimant contended, probably because
of the language in Gonzales, that a general injury was established as a
matter of law, because of the undisputed medical evidence that the neurosis
68. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Marmolejo, 383 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. 1964); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Espinosa, 367 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1963); Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Brownlee, 152 Tex. 247, 256 S.W.2d 76 (1953).
69. 522 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1975).
70. Id. at 193.
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arose following the injury-a chain of causation argument. In reply the
court wrote:7
1
It may be true that... [the] anxiety state can be traced back to the
period of time immediately following his accident for if there had been
no accident and no physical harm there would have been no resulting
claim or suit. This, however, would not show conclusively as a matter
of law that the anxiety state was a wholly separate injury arising out
of the original accident. As was stated in Texas Employers' Associa-
tion v. Espinosa, 367 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1963):
'Specific injuries like all bodily injuries have their painful after-
maths and like undesirable consequences, but mere proof of this
is insufficient in law to show an extension of a specific injury.'
It therefore must be concluded that although the claimant may be dis-
abled by reason of a neurosis traceable in part to circumstances arising
out of and immediately following his injury, there must be a finding
that the neurosis was the result of the injury.
The similarities between Gonzales and Wilson are startling. The results
are perplexing and seemingly irreconcilable at first blush because of the
identity of the "chain of causation" arguments advanced by both claimants.
,Further analysis, however, indicates that both opinions reached the correct
result but Gonzales for the wrong reasons and based on the wrong theory.
A study of the evidence in Gonzales clearly reveals that the claimant's
physical problems subsequent to the injury resulted from the injections and
other medical treatment administered to him because of the original injury to
the hand. These injections and/or an apparent reaction to the medication
set in motion the entire series of physical problems, including paralysis of his
upper body and lower extremities as well as numbness of both legs, which
resulted in the general disability. Thus, it would seem that the correct
theory of recovery, based on the recitation of the evidence, is the well-
established proposition that the employee is entitled to recover for any
disability resulting from consequences and sequelae of the medical treatment
instituted to cure or relieve the effects of his injury. In such case the
disability is considered to be proximately caused by the original injury and is,
therefore, compensable. 72 Based on this theory of recovery, it appears that
the result reached in Gonzales was correct. However, using the theory of
extension of a specific injury into a general injury results in an opinion of
questionable authority which can only cast doubt on the validity of estab-
lished theories.7 3
71. Id. at 194-95.
72. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Thurmond, 527 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pool, 449
S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.- Texarkana 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Sosa, 425 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); IA A. LAR-
SON, supra note 42, §§ 13.00-.11.
73. There was also an additional difficulty in Gonzales with the specific injury
theory of recovery which was raised by the carrier in the court of civil appeals but ap-
parently ignored by the supreme court or perhaps not brought forth in the application
for writ of error. The carrier objected to the special issues because they simply inquired
whether the injury to the left hand extended to and affected any part of the claimant's
body other than the left hand. 506 S.W.2d at 307. This precise submission had been
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Good Cause-General Injury. To perfect a claim for compensation an
employee must give notice of injury and file a claim for compensation within
the time prescribed by statute.74  The statute also provides that "for good
cause" strict compliance with the limitations may be waived.75 Numerous
good cause cases have been litigated in recent years, 76 and this survey year
was no exception. Analysis of prior opinions evokes the observation that the
courts seem to have required more strict adherence to this portion of the
statute than any other portion of the workmen's compensation law.77
In Lee v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. 78 the employee was
injured on May 5, 1976, 79 but his claim for compensation was not filed with
the Board until June 16, 1970, three years, one month and ten days after
the injury. Several days after the accident, the claimant asked a supervisor
if the "papers" had been sent in, and he was told that the supervisor notified
the insurance carrier, and that the owner had notified the "Accidental
Board." After seeking medical treatment, and approximately two months
after the injury, the employee again talked to his employer about a medical
report from his doctor and was assured it would be sent to the "Accidental
Board." Approximately one month later, the claimant again talked to his
supervisor and again received assurance that the accident had been reported
to the carrier and the Board. In August 1967 the insurance carrier paid a
$90 medical bill incurred by the claimant. Approximately twenty months
later an independent insurance adjuster, acting on behalf of the carrier,
contacted the claimant with respect to a final settlement. Over the next
thirteen months, the insurance adjuster and the claimant had many conversa-
tions and many meetings, and each time the adjuster would assure the
claimant not to worry about his workmen's compensation benefits because he
would be "taken care of." In June 1970 the claimant was informed that no
claim had ever been filed and that he would not receive compensation.
Shortly thereafter, the claimant was discharged from his employment of
eighteen years. Several days later, the claimant personally filed a claim with
the Industrial Accident Board. The employee testified that he did not know
he needed to file a claim for compensation, but thought his employer and
supervisor would file the necessary papers. 'He also testified that had he
known he needed to file a claim, he would have done so and would not have
relied on anyone to do so for him.
condemned by the supreme court in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Marmolejo, 383 S.W.2d 380
(Tex. 1964), but the court of civil appeals sustained the submission.
74. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hubbard, 518 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1974);
Continental Cas. Co. v. Cook, 515 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1974); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Hughes, 497 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1973); Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.
1969).
77. See cases cited in note 76 supra. See also Moronko v. Consolidated Mut. Ins.
Co., 435 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1968); accord, Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Renfro, 496
S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ dism'd).
78. 530 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1975).
79. Article 8307, § 7a provides that the limitations of § 4a shall not begin to run
against the employee until the employer files the employer's first report of injury (§ 7),
provided the employer or the Association had notice of the injury. This provision was
not involved in Lee since this amendment was not effective until Aug. 30, 1971.
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The jury rendered a total and permanent verdict for the claimant, finding
that he had good cause for failing to file his claim. Judgment was entered in
favor of the claimant, but the court of civil appeals reversed and rendered
judgment for the carrier, noting that the courts have uniformly held that the
test for good cause is whether the employee prosecuted his claim with that
degree of diligence as would have been exercised by a person of ordinary
prudence under the same or similar circumstances. 80 The appeals court also
emphasized the well-established law that ignorance of the statutory require-
ments will not excuse a failure to file a claim. 81 The court held that there
was no evidence that the claimant relied upon his employer to file a claim on
his behalf because he had testified he would have filed the claim himself had
he known of the requirement. This holding is particularly unfortunate since
it is well established that reliance upon one's employer does indeed constitute
good cause under certain circumstances. 8 2
The supreme court, after analyzing the evidence, simply held that given
the totality of the facts, circumstances and conduct of the claimant, it could
not be said, as a matter of law, that good cause did not exist up to the time
that the claim was filed. Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of the court
of civil appeals and remanded the cause to that court for a consideration of
points not considered. In reaching this holding the supreme court distin-
guished a case relied upon by both parties, Allstate Insurance Co. v. King,83
observing that in King the claimant was fully aware of the seriousness of his
injuries and incapacity and had never received any benefits of any kind from
his employer or the insurance company after he was fired from his job two
months after his accident. The claimant in King filed no claim until
fourteen months after his employment was terminated. Moreover, in King it
was not contended that anyone told the claimant that a claim had actually
been filed, as the claimant in Lee had been told, because King's only
contention was that his employer promised to file a claim-an important
distinction in good cause cases.
In Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Thomas8 4 the court affirmed a
total-permanent verdict, overruling the carrier's attack on the jury's good
cause findings. The court summarily disposed of the points with a bare
recitation of the evidence. In fact, it is difficult even to begin to evaluate
80. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 521 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana), rev'd and remanded, 530 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1975), citing Moronko v. Con-
solidated Mut. Ins. Co., 435 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1968), and Hawkins v. Safety Cas. Co.,
146 Tex. 381, 207 S.W.2d 370 (1948); accord, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hub-
bard, 518 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1974); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hughes, 497 S.W.2d 282
(Tex. 1973); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Portley, 153 Tex. 62, 263 S.W.2d 247
(1953); Copinjon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 242 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-San An-
tonio 1951, writ ref'd).
81. 521 S.W.2d at 741, citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.
1969).
82. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1969); Texas Employ-
ers' Ins. Ass'n v. Coronado, 519 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 510 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Echols, 508 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
83. 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1969).
84. 517 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the court's holding because of the small amount of recited evidence. Appar-
ently, the employee was injured on April 8, 1971, but did not file his claim
with the Board until June 7, 1972, one year, one month and twenty-nine
days later. The injury was evidently reported by the employee, and soon
thereafter he was told by his employer that it was unnecessary to file a claim
because "the company would take care of it." Subsequently, the employee
filed his claim when told to do so by a representative of the Board. During
the interim, the claimant continued working for his employer doing light
work but earning full wages. Without reciting any other evidence (assuming
there must have been more), the court simply held there was evidence to
support the jury's good cause finding, citing three cases.85 Reviewing the
court's cited authority is useless, however, because of the total lack of
evidence of any good cause existing after the first six months and up to the
date of the filing of the claim. The mere fact that the claimant may have
continued to work for the same employer is certainly not sufficient, without
more, to support a good cause claim.86  It is, of course, elementary that
good cause must exist up to the time the claim is actually filed,87 but in the
instant case the evidence recited by the court fails to demonstrate continuing
good cause.
Incredibly, the same court decided a similar case holding that the employ-
ee failed to establish good cause, reversing the trial court judgment and
rendering judgment for the carrier. In Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v.
Coronado"8 the claimant was injured in July 1970, but his claim for
compensation was not filed until January 31, 1972. The injury consisted of
an allergic reaction to a product used in his employment. Although his
condition continued to deteriorate, he continued working for the same
employer. In March 1971, however, he terminated his employment and did
not work thereafter. The evidence demonstrated that soon after the injury
he was assured by the employer that a claim would be filed. Subsequently,
on an unidentified date, the claimant was assured a claim had been filed.
This was the only basis for the failure to file a claim. The San Antonio
appeals court concluded, however, that the claimant knew his injury was
serious and knew he had a claim for compensation but still failed to take
action, as would a reasonably prudent person, to protect his rights.8 9
In Dillard v. Aetna Insurance Co.,90 a summary judgment case, the
Austin court assumed the claimant had good cause for failing to file her
85. Id. at 837, citing Moronko v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 435 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
1968), Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bruns, 490 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Dewett, 460 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
86. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1969); Dillard v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 518 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brantley, 402 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1966);
Texas Cas. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 391 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 994
(1966); Jones v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 128 Tex. 437, 99 S.W.2d 903 (1937);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Coronado, 519 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
88. 519 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
89. Id. at 519-20.
90. 518 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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claim until June 1972, ten months after her injury. The claim was not
actually filed until November 1972 because the claimant was told by a clerk
at the Industrial Accident Board in Austin that she did not need to file a
claim until six months after the employer filed its first report of injury.
Furthermore, the clerk advised the claimant that an employer's report of
injury had not been filed. This advice was, of course, erroneous, since the
accident occurred in August 1971. 91 The court properly held that ignorance
of the law was not good cause nor was erroneous advice from a clerk at the
Industrial Accident Board, since erroneous advice from an attorney does not
constitute good cause.92
Other good cause cases decided during the survey year offered no
surprises. In Transport Insurance Co. v. Ansley,93 to be distinguished from
the facts in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Thomas,94 the court
properly noted that even though the employer told the claimant a claim
would be filed, and even though the claimant continued to work for the same
employer for several months, a twelve-month delay in filing was not, as a
matter of law, good cause.9 5 In Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v.
Allen9" the claimant suffered a heart attack which the jury found to be a
result of an accidental injury, but failed to file a claim for two years and
three months. The claimant acknowledged he knew his heart condition was
related to his job activities and that his injury was serious but stated that he
delayed filing his claim because he thought he would eventually be able to
return to work and because his personal physician never told him the injury
was job related. The court held that the claimant's conduct did not meet the
standard of ordinary care and reversed and rendered judgment for the
carrier.
Good Cause-Death Claim. The filing requirements applicable to general
and specific injuries are also applicable to beneficiaries of a deceased
employee. 7  Good cause can excuse a failure to file a claim timely. 98 In
Davis v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n99 the widow filed her claim
twenty months after the employee's death. Her testimony established that
her husband returned home after performing heavy work and suffered an
apparent heart attack. She was given a copy of a death certificate wherein a
justice of the peace-serving as coroner-listed the cause of death as
"natural causes-heart failure." It was not until many months later, while
talking to her husband's co-worker, that she learned her husband had
become sick on the day of his death but had continued to work. Her claim
was filed immediately thereafter. The trial court granted the carrier's
91. See note 79 supra.
92. See cases cited in 518 S.W.2d at 257.
93. 526 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ).
94. 517 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see note
84 supra and accompanying text.
95. 526 S.W.2d at 188.
96. 519 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
97. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
98. Id.
99. 516 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ).
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motion for summary judgment, but the court of civil appeals reversed the
judgment and remanded the case for trial. The case is unusual because the
widow's allegation of good cause was based solely on her reliance upon the
death certificate made out by the coroner, a case of first impression in Texas.
The court analogized the reliance upon the coroner's report to the well-
established line of cases in which there has been reliance upon representa-
tions by a medical doctor'00 and characterized the widow's reliance upon the
report as reasonable under the circumstances, citing the coroner's statutory
duty to determine and certify the correct cause of death.' 0 ' It seems
somewhat superfluous to connect the coroner's statutory duty to the reasona-
bly prudent conduct standard, since there did not appear to be any circum-
stances surrounding the death, evident to the widow, which would put her on
notice that the heart attack was job related. The surrounding circumstances
would seem to be the key to cases of reliance upon representations by
doctors or, as in Davis, coroners. Unless there are contraindications evident
to the claimant, would it be unreasonable to rely upon what appear to be
expert conclusions? Probably not.
Independent Contractor Versus Employee. The Texas Workmen's Compen-
sation Act does not, of course, provide compensation for independent
contractors. The distinction between an employee and an independent
contractor is based primarily on control or the right of control of the details
of the work.10 2 In the absence of a written contract the actual exercise of
control is sufficient to establish an employer-employee relationship.103 With-
out question, this has become one of the difficult areas of compensation law.
The supreme court has recently shed light on this problem area, however,
and has eased the burden of distinguishing what has become an ephemeral
concept. Continental Insurance Co. v. Wollord'04 involved a brick mason
who orally contracted with Tiffany Homes, Inc., to lay bricks at a townhouse
construction site. Claimant agreed to furnish his own helpers, scaffolding,
and wheelbarrow. Tiffany was to supply bricks, water, mortar, and sand.
Payment was seven cents per brick, but the cost of the mortar and sand was
deducted from the claimant's payments. Nothing was withheld for social
security or income tax purposes. After working one week under this
arrangement, the claimant was injured in a fall from a scaffold.
At trial the claimant testified that the Tiffany supervisor had the right to
fire him at any time if his work was done improperly. Tiffany's carrier
apparently did not produce any evidence concerning the right of control. The
jury concluded the claimant was an employee. The Houston [Fourteenth
District] court of civil appeals, 105 in a lengthy opinion, analyzed numerous
prior opinions and concluded that the jury's verdict was supported by
100. See id. at 454-55 and cases cited and discussed therein.
101. Id. at 454.
102. See, e.g., Anchor Cas. Co. v. Hartsfield, 390 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1965); News-
papers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1964).
103. Id.
104. 526 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. 1975).




sufficient evidence. In affirming the verdict the court held that the claim-
ant's uncontroverted testimony that Tiffany could fire him at any time was
sufficient, in spite of all other factors, to establish a right of control. In so
holding the court relied upon the similar decision of Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Boggs.10 Upon review of Wolford the supreme court reversed
the judgments of the lower courts and rendered judgment for the carrier,
concluding that the claimant's testimony merely reflected that Tiffany could
discharge him if dissatisfied with his work. Contrary to the specific holding
by the court of civil appeals, the supreme court was of the opinion that the
right to discharge was not evidence of control of the details of the work or of
a right to control the details. Since the right to terminate exists with either
an employee or an independent contractor, such right could not be determi-
native of the claimant's status with Tiffany. The court noted that the
minimal degree of control by Tiffany was much less than that found in the
leading case of Anchor Casualty Co. v. Hartsfield'0 7 and, therefore, the
claimant was held to be an independent contractor as a matter of law.
Injury in the Course and Scope of Employment. During the 1974 survey
year, a divided Tyler court of civil appeals in Millers Mutual Fire Insurance
Co. v. Scott108 held there was no evidence to establish that the employee
received an injury in the course and scope of his employment. During this
survey year, however, the supreme court reversed the appeals court judg-
ment, holding there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's
finding of accidental injury.1 9 There was no direct evidence of how the
employee was injured or what type of work, if any, he was doing at the time
of injury. The employee was seen on the employer's premises at approxi-
mately 7:00 a.m., but he never punched his time card for that day. The
evidence indicated, however, that the time clock did not always function. At
approximately 7:30 a.m. he helped a co-employee start a fork lift which
caught fire. The fire department was called and came to the premises to
fight the fire. About thirty minutes later the employee was seen standing
near the scale house apparently doing nothing, and several hours thereafter
he was found unconscious, bleeding from the mouth, nose, and ear. Al-
though his duties did not normally require him to be in the area where he
was found, he testified that he was occasionally required to do some work
around that area. There was also evidence that a whiskey bottle was found
near the scene of the accident, in addition to testimony that the employee
had been sent home several days prior to the injury because he was
intoxicated. The testimony was disputed as to whether the employee
smelled of alcohol when he was found and whether he had seemed drunk
earlier in the morning. The employee suffered a severe head injury and
could not testify as to how the injury occurred or the nature of his activities
from 8:00 a.m. until he was found.
106. 66 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933, writ dism'd).
107. 390 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1965).
108. 513 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974), reviewed in Sartwelle, supra
note 2, at 202-04.
109. Scott v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 524 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1975).
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As noted by the supreme court, it is the employee's obligation to prove
that his injuries were sustained in the course and scope of his employment by
proving that they had to do with and originated in the work of his employer
and were received by him while engaged in or about the furtherance of the
employer's affairs or business. 110 Acknowledging the total absence of direct
evidence demonstrating an injury in the course and scope of employment,
the employee argued that his retrograde amnesia was sufficient to make the
case analogous to those involving an employee found dead at a place where
his duties required him to be or where he may properly be while performing
his duties during regular work hours. In such cases, the employee argued,
there is a presumption of injury in the course and scope of employment,
absent evidence to the contrary.' 1 ' The majority of the court of civil
appeals seemingly acknowledged the existence of such a presumption but
held that the presumption is rebuttable, and that the evidence produced by
the carrier destroyed the presumption. Thereafter, the presumption is
unavailable as evidence. 112 The supreme court refused to decide whether a
presumption of course and scope arises in a case where the employee claims
a loss of memory because the court of civil appeals had been correct in
holding that any such presumption had been rebutted, but more importantly,
because there was a jury finding in favor of the employee, supported by
legally sufficient evidence, thereby making the existence of a presumption
irrelevant.1 13
,In considering the sufficiency of the employee's evidence, viewing the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
verdict and disregarding all contrary evidence, the court emphasized these
facts: (1) the employee was injured on the employer's premises during
regular work hours on a regular work day; (2) he was injured at a place
where he could properly be in performing his duties; (3) it did not
affirmatively appear that he did not begin work on the day in question or
that he stopped work to pursue a personal mission.1 4  The third empha-
sized "fact" appears to be a holding that the carrier must affirmatively
produce evidence to demonstrate that the employee did no work at all or
that he pursued a mission of his own. If so, new law has been written into
the Compensation Act. Such a holding seems more appropriate to appellate
review of a summary judgment case rather than a jury verdict. It would
seem to be more advisable for the court to rely simply on the affirmative
evidence from the claimant's witnesses to the effect that he was not
110. Id. at 288, citing Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.
1963).
111. The employee cited Elledge v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 312 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.), American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 250
S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 152 Tex. 99,
255 S.W.2d 502 (1953), and Associated Employers Lloyds v. Wiggins, 208 S.W.2d 705
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
112. 513 S.W.2d at 250; cf. Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d
354 (Tex. 1971); Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Muegge, 135 Tex. 520, 143 S.W.2d 763(1940); Mitchell v. Ellis, 374 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963, writ
ref'd).




intoxicated on the morning of the accident. Combined with the other
emphasized "facts," this testimony would seem to reduce the case to a simple
fact issue which was decided in favor of the claimant by the jury. Other-
wise, despite the court's protestations to the contrary, the case stands for the
proposition that in fact there is a presumption in favor of injury in the course
and scope of employment which presumption must be affirmatively rebutted
by the carrier. This would be contrary to previous case law regarding the
use of a presumption as evidence. 15
The Beaumont court of civil appeals decided the case of City of Austin v.
Johnson"6 on the basis that the employee's injury did not originate in the
work, business, or trade of the employer, but the opinion also may have
implications in the area of occupational disease. The suit was based on the
theory that the deceased's heart attack was caused by emotional stress,
worry, and anxiety arising from the termination of his job. The widow
alleged that on September 9, 1971, the employee was informed that his job
with the city of Austin would be terminated on October 1, 1971. The
emotional reaction allegedly contributed to a fatal heart attack on September
20, 1971. A jury verdict was returned in favor of the widow.
The court recognized that the definition of "injury sustained in the course
of employment" contained in article 8309,' section 11'7 requires that the
injury be of such kind and character as has to do with and originate in the
employer's work and must be suffered while the employee is engaged in or
about the furtherance of the affairs of the employer." 8 The court then
wrote:
In Kimbrough v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 168 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1943, writ ref'd), we find:
'The injury must be brought about by a risk which is incidental to
and arises out of the task the workman has to do in fulfilling his
contract for service, and to which the employee would not be sub-
jected but for the employment contract for service.'
See also Safety Casualty Co. v. Wright, 138 Tex. 492, 160 S.W.2d 238,
242 (1942):
'In this connection, it may be said that a risk is incidental to em-
ployment when it belongs to or is connected with what a workman
has to do in performing his contract of service.'
To hold that worry and anxiety over job loss is 'connected with what a
workman has to do in performing his contract of service' would in our
opinion not be reasonable." 9
115. See cases cited note 112 supra. It is interesting to note that on remand to the
court of civil appeals the Tyler court sustained the carrier's insufficiency points of error
and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Scott, 529 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).
116. 525 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967).
118. 525 S.W.2d at 221, citing Smith v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 129 Tex. 573,
105 S.W.2d 192 (1937), Texas Indem. Co. v. Clark, 125 Tex. 96, 81 S.W.2d 67 (1935),
and McKim v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 179 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1944, writ ref'd); see, e.g., Tex. Gen. Indem. Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.
1963).
119. 525 S.W.2d at 221.
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The Beaumont court noted the absence of any Texas authority involving
this particular fact situation but cited and relied on three out-of-state cases in
holding that such injury is not compensable. 120 Thus, the trial court was
reversed and judgment rendered that the claimant take nothing.
The beneficiary in Johnson undoubtedly based her cause of action on an
accidental injury theory, i.e., an undesigned, unforeseen, untoward, or
unexpected event traceable to a definite time, place and cause,121 rather
than on the pre-1971 occupational disease statute 122 which contained an
exclusive list of physically induced diseases qualifying as occupational
diseases. The 1971 amendment of the occupational disease statute trans-
formed the specific list of diseases into a definition which expanded the
occupational disease concept to include any disease arising out of the
employment situation as well as diseases induced by repetitious physical
traumatic activity. 123  At this time last year only three reported cases had
considered the amended occupational disease statute124 and the same is true
for the 1975 survey year. None of these cases has shed any light on the
operation of the new amendment, but at least one commentator has already
suggested, as contended in Johnson, that mentally induced diseases, i.e., high
blood pressure, heart attacks, etc., are compensable under the amended
statute.12 5 Analysis of prior compensation law as well as the wording of the
new statute demonstrates this is not so. 20
Occupational disease has long been recognized to be a disease which is
acquired in the usual and ordinary course of employment and which is
incidental thereto. 127  While this element of occupational disease is not
120. Id., citing Seals v. City of Baton Rouge, 94 So. 2d 478 (La. Ct. App. 1957),
In re Korsun's Case, 354 Mass. 124, 235 N.E.2d 814 (1968), and Chapman v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 221 Tenn. 376, 426 S.W.2d 760 (1968).
121. See, e.g., Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.
1972); Consolidated Underwriters v. Wright, 408 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Solomon v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 17
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd).
122. Ch. 113, §§ 2-9, [1947] Tex. Laws 176-80 (repealed 1971).
123. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Supp. 1975-76):
'Occupational Disease' shall be construed to mean any disease arising
out of and in the course of employment which causes damage or harm to
the physical structure of the body and such other diseases or infections as
naturally result therefrom. An 'Occupational Disease' shall also include
damage or harm to the physical structure of the body occurring as the re-
sult of repetitious physical traumatic activities extending over a period of
time and arising in the course of employment; provided, that the date of
the cumulative injury shall be the date disability was caused thereby. Or-
dinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of
the employment shall not be compensable, except where such diseases
follow as an incident to an 'Occupational Disease' or 'Injury' as defined
in this section.
124. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 511 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (dictum); Haley v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 487
S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Legate v. Bituminous
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 483 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). Haley and Legate both held that the amendment was not applicable because
the case under consideration arose prior to the effective date of the amendment.
125. Terry, Occupational Disease and Cumulative Injury, 8 TRIAL LAw. F., April-
June 1974, at 3.
126. See Sartwelle, supra note 2, at 183-90.
127. See, e.g., Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. McKay, 146 Tex. 569, 210 S.W.2d 147(1948); Solomon v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ.
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generally recognized as emanating from the definition of injury in the course
of employment as written in article 8309, this does appear to be its
source.128 Thus, a workman contending that emotional stress, anxiety, and
worry created by a job situation resulted in physical injuries must prove not
only that the injury occurred while the workman was engaged in or about the
furtherance of his employer's affairs or business, he also must establish, as
required by article 8309, that the injury was of a kind and character that
had to do with and originated in the employer's work, trade, or profes-
sion. 2 9  These requirements are reflected in the amended occupational
disease definition which qualifies compensable diseases as being only those
arising "out of and in the course of employment" and excludes "ordinary
diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the
employment." 0  While these two sections of the Act use slightly different
wording, the intent of the statute is to exclude those diseases that do not
originate in and arise out of job-related risks. Certainly, an accidental injury,
either physical or mental, with or without physical harm to the bodily
structures, is compensable when traceable to a definite time, place, and
cause,13 ' but untraceable stimuli such as anxiety, tension, pressure, and
overwork present tenuous proof problems which would end only when all
alleged injuries to the nervous system and psyche are declared compensable.
Such result would convert compensation insurance into employee health
insurance. 13 2  Fortunately, the Beaumont court of civil appeals recognized
these problems in Johnson, and, it is submitted, correctly held that it is
unreasonable to saddle industry with the burden of "cradle-to-grave" health
insurance.'3
3
App.-San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Cowan, 271
S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rudd v. Gulf Cas.
Co., 257 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1953, no writ); American Sur. Co. v.
Ritchie, 182 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
128. Cf. Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Texas Gen.
Indem. Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963); Walker v. Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n, 443 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ ref'd); Thomas v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co., 423 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, writ ref'd).
129. See cases cited at note 128 supra.
130. TFx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Supp. 1975-76).
131. See, e.g., Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315
(1955); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 417 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
132. Cf. Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972);
Houston Fire & Cas. Co. v. Biber, 146 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940,
writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
133. The court of civil appeals in Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Olson, 466
S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971), aff'd, 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972),
denying a heart attack claim based on several alleged frustrating job experiences oc-
curring over a 19-day period, commented:
Regardless of the liberal construction of the Workmen's Compensation
Act in favor of the workman, of the purpose of the Act to place on the
shoulders of industry the expense incident to the hazard, and with sym-
pathy for the workman and his family, there is still no basis upon which
to convert the statute into employees' health insurance, which we would
have to do to affirm this case. We are making this statement aware that
we are not producing an exact legal test that can be applied at all times.
We regret this, but the courts are having this problem universally when
they attempt to draw the line in heart cases.
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Course and Scope of Employment-Borrowed Servant. A borrowed servant
is usually considered to be the general employee of one employer but
becomes a borrowed or special servant of another when performing specific
acts on behalf of the latter.134  Naturally, when the borrowed servant is
injured the question arises as to which employer will be burdened with the
compensation claim.' 3 5  The borrowed servant problem arose in a rather
strange way in Associated Indemnity Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co.' 36  Hartford was the compensation carrier for a temporary labor
contractor supplying temporary employees to various businesses. The par-
ticular employee involved was hired by Hartford's insured and sent to work
on the premises and under the control of Associated's insured, the Frito-Lay
Company. The oral contract specified that Frito-Lay would pay the labor
contractor a fixed hourly charge for the worker, but out of this hourly charge
the labor contractor would pay all wages, social security and withholding
taxes, and also would pay for workmen's compensation coverage. After his
injury, the employee made a claim against Frito-Lay, but was told that he
was the employee of the labor contractor. He filed claim against Hartford,
who did not deny coverage but made a voluntary settlement. This settle-
ment was made in accordance with a general practice of Hartford to pay
claims of the labor contractor's employees for injuries sustained while
working under the direction and control of the labor contractor's customers
such as Frito-Lay. The employee then filed a third-party action against
Frito-Lay. Hartford intervened, asserting its claim for compensation subro-
gation. Hartford also impleaded Associated as a third-party defendant,
alleging that Associated actually owed the compensation which Hartford
paid. The trial court denied the employee's claim on the ground that Frito-
Lay was the actual employer and, therefore, could not be subject to a
common law suit by the injured workman.' 3 7  Hartford's claim against
Associated was remanded to the trial court and both filed motions for
summary judgment. The trial court granted Hartford's motion.
This is apparently a case of first impression in Texas. Associated argued
that the labor contractor could properly agree to furnish workmen's compen-
sation coverage on temporary employees since such employees must be
considered employees of both the labor contractor and Frito-Lay. In
support of this contention Associated relied on several out-of-state cases
apparently holding that one could be a simultaneous employee of the labor
contractor and the temporary employer. Hartford, on the other hand, took
the position that the dual employment theory was inconsistent with the
established Texas borrowed servant doctrine which made the temporary
134. See, e.g., J.A. Robinson Sons v. Wigart, 431 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. 1968); Producers
Chem. Co. v. McKay, 366 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1963).
135. See cases cited at note 134 supra. See also Home Indem. Co. v. Draper, 504
S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rotge v.
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 502 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App,-San Antonio 1973, no
writ).
136. 524 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
137. Id. at 375, citing Waldroup v. Frito-Lay, Inc., No. 4643 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land, Aug. 10, 1973) (unreported).
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employer, i.e., the employer with the right of control over the details of the
work at the time of the injury, the employer chargeable with compensation
responsibility. Hartford further contended that any contract whereby the
temporary employer assumed responsibility for workmen's compensation
payments would be illegal. No Texas case had ever decided that particular
issue, and the Dallas court of civil appeals neatly side-stepped it by holding,
based on principles of equitable subrogation, that Hartford had not shown
any unjust enrichment and, therefore, was not entitled to recovery. As an
aside, the court also pointed out that if Hartford's contention that the
arrangement for compensation between the parties was illegal, then Hartford
was attempting to take advantage of an illegal transaction which could not be
enforced under equitable principles. Thus, the court reversed the judgment
in favor of Hartford and rendered judgment denying all recovery by
Hartford against Associated.
Third-Party Suits. The whole scheme of subrogation and recovery from
third parties was completely rewritten in 1973 when the legislature amended
section 6a of article 8307.18s In place of what had been a simplistic,
straightforward statute, the legislature created a complicated and sometimes
vague scheme which appears to be designed primarily to enhance fees
collected by claimants' attorneys, while further increasing the expense of
workmen's compensation coverage without a concomitant increase in benefits
to the injured workman. At this writing there has been only one case,
Simpson v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n,189 which has considered this
new subrogation scheme. In this case, however, the court was not called
upon to interpret the actual provisions of the statute but only to decide
whether the 1973 amendment was substantive or procedural and, therefore,
retroactive. The survivors of a deceased employee and the compensation
carrier, Texas Employers', stipulated, as had been the prevalent practice
under the old statute, that Texas Employers' would be entitled to recover its
full subrogation lien from the first monies recovered by the plaintiffs from a
negligent third party. The employee died on April 15, 1970, some three
years prior to the amendment. After the effective date of the amendment,
the third-party action went to trial and was settled, but the attorneys
representing the plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to attorneys' fees as
stipulated in the amended statute. Plaintiffs, arguing the provisions of
article 8309, section 3b'140 which provides, in effect, that amendments to the
Act shall not affect pending compensation cases, contended that this section
was limited only to the amount of weekly benefits payable. The court of
civil appeals, however, in a well-reasoned opinion, overruled this contention,
holding that the amendment to the subrogation statute was substantive and
not merely procedural and could not constitutionally be retroactive. The
appeals court thus sustained the trial court's denial of attorneys' fees to the
plaintiffs' attorneys.
138. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Supp. 1975-76).
139. 519 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
140. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 3b (Supp. 1975-76).
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Second Injury Fund-Prior and Subsequent Compensable Injuries. Prior to
September 1, 1971, section 12c of article 8306141 provided the insurer the
defense of percentage contribution of prior compensable injuries to a present
incapacity. The rationale for this provision was said to be to encourage
employers to hire handicapped workers and to prevent double recovery for
the same incapacity. 142 The 1971 amendment of section 12c 143 destroyed
this defense by providing that "the Association shall be liable for all
compensation provided by this Act.' 44  In the survey year 1974 the
Eastland court of civil appeals specifically held that under amended section
12c "proof of a prior compensable injury will no longer reduce recovery of a
workman because of such prior injury.' 45 In Texas Employers' Insurance
Ass'n v. Haunschild 46 the carrier attacked the amended statute, contending
that it was not liable for the combined incapacities created by multiple
compensable injuries. The Amarillo court of civil appeals, speaking through
Justice Reynolds, in one of the most impressive, thorough, and persuasive
opinions by any Texas court in recent years, reached the same conclusion as
did the Creswell court, i.e., proof of a prior compensable injury will no
longer reduce a workman's recovery for subsequent incapacity. In Haun-
schild the employee injured his neck in July 1973 and underwent two
operations. The carrier introduced evidence of a prior compensable back
and neck injury occurring in 'November 1972 which resulted in back surgery.
The jury found that the 1972 injury contributed sixty-five percent to the
employee's incapacity at the time of trial. The trial court disregarded the
contribution finding and entered judgment for the full compensation due for
the present incapacity. The sole question on appeal was whether the 1971
amendment to section 12c still allowed reduction of the carrier's liability by
the percentage of incapacity contributed by a prior compensable injury.
The carrier contended that the legislature intended the amendment to
affect only those cases wherein the carrier was entitled to reimbursement
from the Second Injury Fund 147 but that in all other cases the carrier would
still be entitled to reduce recovery by the amount a previous compensable
141. Ch. 349, § 1, [1947] Tex. Laws 690.
142. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d
744 (1962); Gilmore v. Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n, 292 S.W. 204 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); see Altman, The Status of "Other Compensable Injuries"
Under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, 10 TRIAL LAw. F., Oct.-Dec. 1975, at
18.
143. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Supp. 1975-76) provides:
If an employee who has suffered a previous injury shall suffer a subse-
quent injury which results in a condition of incapacity to which both in-juries or their effects have contributed, the Association shall be liable for
all compensation provided by this Act, but said Association shall be reim-
bursed from the 'Second Injury Fund' as hereinafter described, to the ex-
tent that the previous injury contributes to the combined incapacity.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Creswell, 511 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
146. 527 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
147. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c-1 (Supp. 1975-76), providing for
reimbursement to the Association in situations involving a combination of specific in-juries resulting in total and permanent incapacity.
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injury contributed to an incapacity. The court of civil appeals, however,
after an exhaustive analysis of the prior statute and the "plain, ordinary
words"' 48 employed by the legislature in the amendment, concluded "that
the workmen's compensation insurance carrier's liability for the incapacity
produced by the combined effects of multiple general injuries is not re-
duced by the percentage of incapacity contributed by compensable general
injuries other than the one in suit."'140
In concluding that an employee is entitled to full compensation regardless
of prior incapacity, the court refused to decide whether the amendment to
the Second Injury Fund statute' 50 entitled the carrier to be reimbursed from
the fund for liability resulting from multiple general injuries as well as
multiple specific injuries causing total and permanent incapacity. The court
preferred to consider that issue in a case directly raising the question. 151 In
light of the seemingly clear language of the Second Injury Fund statute, as
well as the supreme court's interpretation of the operation of the statute,15 2
it seems evident that employers will indeed pay twice for the same incapaci-
ty. This result has been said to remove "the harshness of the law off the
shoulders of the injured workman and place it upon those better able to
protect themselves."' 53  This same author also proposes an amendment to
the Second Injury Fund which would allow insurers to recover from the fund
the portion of the compensation chargeable to the incapacity created by the
prior compensable injury. In this manner, employment of handicapped
workers would be encouraged because the recovery from the fund could then
be applied to the employer's loss experience. 154
This analysis appears to overlook the fact that the fundamental purpose of
the Compensation Act, unlike general tort law, is not to restore completely
what is lost but rather, in a dignified manner, to provide limited financial
support and unlimited medical support which will enable an injured work-
148. 527 S.W.2d at 275.
149. Id. at 275-76.
150. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c-1 (Supp. 1975-76).
151. 527 S.W.2d at 276.
152. The present language of §§ 12c and 12c-1 is identical to the prior language of
these sections except the prior sections refer specifically to the employee, not the Asso-
ciation. Accordingly, prior 1971 Second Injury Fund cases appear to be applicable to
an interpretation of the amended language. In Second Injury Fund v. Keaton, 162 Tex.
250, 345 S.W.2d 711 (1961), the supreme court held that § 12c does not create an inde-
pendent cause of action within itself, but must be construed in connection with § 12c-
1. Section 12c-1 limited the liability of the Second Injury Fund to situations involving
a combination of specific injuries resulting in total and permanent incapacity. The court
specifically noted that combinations of general injuries and injuries resulting only in par-
tial disability were not compensable from the Second Injury Fund.
Under the amended language of § 12c-1, the association must file its claim against
the Second Injury Fund within 180 days following the date of injury. It must also file
evidence of its payment of all compensation provided for under the Act as well as evi-
dence of the pre-existing permanent physical impairment qualifying the association for
reimbursement. Good cause under art. 8307, § 4a is applicable to such filing. Obvi-
ously, in all cases other than an outright severance of a hand, arm, leg, etc., it will be
very difficult to comply with the 180-day requirement, not only from the standpoint of
knowing the full effects of the injury within 180 days, but also producing evidence that
all payments due under the Act have been paid.
153. Altman, supra note 142, at 20.
154. ld. at 21.
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man to recover from the effects of an industrial injury and return to fruitful
employment while passing the cost of the injury on to the consuming
public. 155 Workmen's compensation was never intended to ,be a tort
system, social insurance, or health insurance. 150 Unless workmen's com-
pensation is changed into "cradle-to-grave" health insurance, with the con-
comitant increase in cost and governmental participation, there does not
appear to be any reasonable rationale which would allow tort-like, windfall
recoveries.
Compromise Settlement Agreement-Suit To Set Aside. In the sequel to a
plea of privilege appeal arising during the 1974 survey year,' 57 the Fort
Worth court of civil appeals affirmed a jury verdict finding that false
representations were relied upon by the employee in executing a compromise
settlement agreement and finding the employee totally-permanently disabled.
In the second appeal, Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Sprabery,158 the
evidence demonstrated that the claimant was referred to a doctor by the
carrier and underwent back surgery. The doctor subsequently represented
to him that he had no permanent disability and would be able to return to
his usual occupation. An insurance adjuster told the claimant, who could
neither read nor write, that he could never recover more than $8,000 in
addition to the compensation already paid. A compromise settlement
agreement was executed for the total sum of $6,500. Subsequently, the
employee underwent a third back operation by a doctor of his choice who
advised him he could never return to his former occupation. The carrier did
not contest the total-permanent finding but did argue that the jury's finding
of legal fraud by the doctor and legal fraud by the insurance adjuster were in
irreconcilable conflict. It is difficult to determine the basis for this conten-
tion based on the recitations in the court's opinion, but the court of civil
appeals summarily swept aside the carrier's attack, holding that there was no
fatal conflict.' 5 9
Suit To Set Aside Board Award. In order to appeal an award of the
Industrial Accident Board the statute requires that within twenty days of the
date of the award notice must be given to the Board of the intent to
appeal. 160 Within twenty days after filing notice of intention to appeal a
suit to set aside the award must be filed in the county where the injury
occurred. 10  These statutory requirements constitute a general statute of
limitation,' 62 and compliance with each provision is mandatory and jurisdic-
155. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 42, § 2.00-.70.
156. Id.; cf. Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972);
Houston Fire & Cas. Co. v. Biber, 146 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940,
writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
157. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Sprabery, 507 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974, no writ).
158. 520 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
159. Id. at 449, citing Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222
S.W.2d 985 (1949).
160. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).
161. Id.
162. Richards v. Consolidated Underwriters, 411 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1967, writ ref'd).
1976]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tional. 163 The most frequent reason why compensation appeals are dis-
missed, other than for simple failure to comply with the statutory time limits,
seems to be for filing suit against the wrong insurance company! In the
1974 survey year the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of an employee's
suit because the carrier was misnamed,' 64 and during this survey year there
were three appeals in which the carrier was misnamed.
In Garcia v. Employers Casualty Co.'65 the employee gave timely notice
of appeal and filed suit to set aside the Industrial Accident Board award
rendered against Employers Casualty Company as the workmen's compensa-
tion carrier for Texas Tech University. Unfortunately, rather than naming
Employers Casualty Company as defendant, Texas Employers' Insurance
Association was named and service requested through the Insurance Com-
missioner. Prior to any answer by Texas Employers', but after the expiration
of twenty days from the date of filing notice of appeal, the employee filed a
"supplemental petition to show correct name of defendant." This pleading
correctly named Employers Casualty Company as the defendant and re-
quested service on the defendant's agent in Lubbock. Each carrier an-
swered and subsequently filed motions for summary judgment. Texas
Employers' filed evidence establishing that it was not the compensation
carrier for the university. Employers Casualty Company sought dismissal of
the suit since it was not timely filed. Both motions were granted.
On appeal, the employee's primary contention was that the mistake as to
the defendant was a misnomer and not a mistake in identity and was
correctable by a supplemental petition with relation back to the date of
original filing, relying on Adams v. Consolidated Underwriters.'16  In
Adams the employee intended to sue Consolidated Underwriters. In fact,
he did actually serve the agent of Consolidated Underwriters but named the
defendant by the wrong corporate name--Consolidated Casualty Underwri-
ters, which did not exist. After the expiration of the statutory time limit, an
amended petition was filed correcting the name of the defendant and service
was again had on the agent served with the original petition. In this
situation the court held that the principal of misnomer applied, and that the
original petition was a timely filing of suit under the statute. The court in
Garcia distinguished Adams on its facts. The court pointed out that Texas
Employers' Insurance Association and Employers Casualty Company were
separate, distinct entities formed at different times under dissimilar names,
despite the fact that they had similar officers and shared offices and
telephone numbers in Lubbock. Thus, the court held that contrary to
Adams, Garcia mistakenly identified, not misnamed, the defendant, i.e.,
sued and served the wrong defendant by its correct legal name and tardily
sued and served the right defendant by its correct legal name, thereby
preventing the operation of the misnomer doctrine.
163. Oilmen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Franklin, 116 Tex. 59, 286 S.W. 195 (1926).
164. Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Martin, 501 S.W.2d 430 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973), idgmt modified per curiam, 505 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. 1974).
165. 519 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. 133 Tex. 26,124 S.W.2d 840 (1939).
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Additionally, the employee argued that article 5539b,1 67 providing that a
plea of limitation is unavailable as a defense to a change of facts or theory
not based on an occurrence distinctly different from the original facts or
theory prevented the operation of the limitation specified in article 8307,
section 5.168 The court of civil appeals disagreed, holding that the manda-
tory and jurisdictional requirements of the Compensation Act would not
allow the substitution of a new and different party under the guise of
amending the theory or facts upon which recovery is sought. The court
pointed out that the specific holding of the supreme court in Latham v.
Security Insurance Co. 169 made the award against Employers Casualty
Company final since it was a party to the Board's award but was not timely
named in the suit seeking to set aside the award.
In Carpenter v. Gulf Insurance Co. 170 the result was the same as in
Garcia but on slightly different facts. The Industrial Accident Board listed
Gulf Insurance Company as the insurance carrier for the employer and
denied any recovery. The employee appealed, naming Gulf Insurance
Company, Gulf Insurance Liquidating Company, and Washington Fire and
Marine Insurance Company as defendants. Two years later the defendants'
attorney advised the employee's attorney that Select Insurance Company was
the proper carrier. The employee's attorney then filed an amended petition
naming Select as a defendant. The trial court dismissed the cause as to the
original defendants and granted Select's motion for summary judgment,
entering a take-nothing judgment as to Select.
On appeal the employee contended that the Industrial Accident Board
furnished erroneous information as to the employer's insurance carrier and
that she relied upon such information to her detriment. In addition, it was
argued that Select had a "duty" to furnish her with the correct information as
to coverage. The court of civil appeals summarily brushed aside these
arguments, holding that since Select was not a party to the proceeding before
the Industrial Accident Board, neither the district court nor the court of civil
appeals could acquire jurisdiction to render any type of order other than one
of dismissal. 171 Because the summary judgment evidence clearly revealed
that none of the original defendants was the carrier for the employee's
employer, the dismissal with prejudice as to them was sustained. Since the
trial court did not acquire any jurisdiction over Select, however, and since
the only proper judgment as to it could be dismissal, 172 the summary
judgment in favor of Select was reversed and judgment rendered dismissing
the cause as to Select. The dismissal as to Select, however, was without
prejudice, since theoretically the employee could refile a claim with the
Industrial Accident Board and establish good cause for the late filing,
thereby reviving the claim against the correct carrier.
167. TEx. R.v. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5539b (1967).
168. Id. art. 8306, § 5.
169. 491 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. 1972).
170. 515 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
171. Id. at 62, citing Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Martin, 505
S.W.2d 799 (Tex. 1974).
172. 515 S.W.2d at 62.
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Finally, in Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. v. Square73 the carrier
narrowly escaped paying a Board award that it attempted to appeal when it
misnamed itself as plaintiff. The carrier timely filed suit to set aside an
award of the Industrial Accident Board styling the suit "Charter Oak Fire
Insurance Co. a/k/a Travelers Insurance Co. v. Dorothy Jean Square." The
claimant filed a plea in abatement alleging that the 'Board's award was
entered against Travelers Insurance Company, the notice of appeal was filed
by Travelers Insurance Company, Charter Oak was not a party to any
Board proceeding, Charter Oak and Travelers were two separate and distinct
corporations and, therefore, the appeal by Charter Oak should be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction. Subsequently, a plaintiff's first amended original
petition was filed deleting all references to Charter Oak and naming
Travelers as the sole plaintiff. However, the trial court sustained the plea in
abatement, dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction.
On appeal, the court of civil appeals noted that the employee's allegations
were indeed correct, that Travelers was the carrier named by the Board in
the award and was the carrier filing the notice of appeal. It was also noted,
however, that courts normally consider a petition in its entirety and construe
it as favorably to the pleader as possible, looking to the pleader's intendment
in order to determine the nature and purpose of the suit. 174  Considering
the petition as a whole, the court of civil appeals concluded that Travelers
could be considered the real plaintiff in interest and since the mere misnam-
ing of the plaintiff in an original petition does not prevent tolling of a statute
of limitations, the misnomer was correctable by an amended petition even
after the running of the statute of limitation. 175 Thus, the trial court's order
was reversed, and the cause remanded for trial on the merits.
Garcia and Square are examples of the confusion that can frequently
occur where carriers have numerous subsidiary companies in their corporate
structures. Frequently, a carrier will underwrite a risk in one of several
subsidiary companies. 170 Although these companies are normally thought
of as being one and the same, they are in fact separate, distinct entities.
Unless care is exercised in naming, as plaintiff or defendant, the particular
company underwriting the risk, either an employee or a carrier risks losing
an appeal. When any doubt exists, it would appear advisable to secure a
copy of the employer's notice of becoming a subscriber which requires the
employer to designate the name of the carrier providing compensation
coverage .177
173. 526 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
174. Id. at 636, citing cases.
175. Id. at 637, citing cases.
176. No explanation was given as to how or why Charter Oak was named in the
Square petition.
177. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308, § 18a (Supp. 1975-76). This section pro-
vides that when an employer becomes a subscriber, or when a policy is renewed, the
employer or the carrier must notify the Board of such fact and provide the Board with
certain information including the name of the insurance company providing the cover-
age. A penalty is provided for noncompliance. Article 8307, § 5 provides that any in-
terested party may obtain a certified copy of the employer's notice of becoming a sub-
scriber, free of charge, upon written request. This section specifically limits the right
to obtain a free certified copy to a claim "pending in Court," but § 9 of the same article
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Injury in the Course of Employment-Heart Attacks and Strokes. One of
the most difficult and frequently litigated issues in compensation law is the
compensability of heart attacks and strokes occurring on the job. The
difficulties arise from a number of inherent problems associated with both
legal and medical theory and from the age-old legal problem of drawing the
line in different fact situations. The combination of all of these perplexing
and sometimes baffling problems has resulted in a large number of disparate
opinions that simply add confusion to an issue desperately in need of
consistency. Moreover, the results of these cases, when compared to those
dealing with other types of compensable injuries, are often ludicrous, com-
pensability turning upon the precise type of work undertaken at the time of
injury as well as the phraseology of the medical testimony. Two examples
of these problems occurred during this survey year.
In Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Mitchusson17 the deceased
workman died of a coronary infarction complicated by a cerebral embolus
resulting in a stroke syndrome. The carrier appealed an award of death
benefits to the widow, apparently contending that there was no evidence or
insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's finding of injury in the course and
scope of employment. The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court
judgment in favor of the widow. The carrier's primary attack centered on
the issue of whether the employee's death resulted from overexertion or
strain related to his job activities. This requirement of overexertion and
strain 179 is the feature which distinguishes heart attack and stroke cases
from all other physical injuries compensable under the Compensation Act.
There is nothing in the compensation statute designating heart attacks or
strokes to be compensable only if they result from overexertion or strain.
This is a court-made doctrine, and it is the primary source of the difficulties
in this area of compensation law, especially when combined with medical
causation problems.
In Mitchusson the court of civil appeals reviewed the evidence, quoting at
length from the record in order to find both overexertion and strain as well
as the medical phraseology connecting the overexertion and strain to the
death-a typical heart attack-stroke opinion. In fact, based on the evidence
recited by the court, it is difficult to discern the reason the case was tried or
appealed, since the elements of compensability as they now exist seemed to
be clearly established.
In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Thurmond'80 the employee
recovered disability benefits for a heart attack and subsequent open heart
surgery allegedly produced by "strain" related to his employment. The
carrier appealed, contending, among other things, that the evidence was
legally and factually insufficient to support the finding of injury and the
finding that the injury was a producing cause of disability. In a unique
provides for furnishing certified copies of any "order, award, decision or paper" on file
with the Board for a specified fee upon receipt of a written request.
178. 515 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no writ).
179. See, e.g., Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d .207 (Tex. 1973);
Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972). ,
180. 527 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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argument, based upon the testimony of a heart surgeon, the carrier contend-
ed that a "heart attack" to be compensable must comply with the accepted
medical definition which encompasses the concept of damage or death of
heart muscle. The employee, forty-one at the time of the accident, suffered
a prior heart attack approximately one year before the attack made the basis
of the suit. He returned to his regular duties as a mechanic after many
months of convalescence, but continued to suffer from angina. On August
13, 1970, while performing his mechanic duties, the employee "had to strain
to lift a pump"'181 and immediately experienced severe chest pains and
dizziness. Twelve days later he underwent a coronary artery bypass opera-
tion which produced complications requiring further surgery several months
later. He was unable to continue working as a mechanic. The jury found
that the claimant sustained an "injury" on August 13, 1970, and that the
"injury" was a producing cause of total-permanent disability. Medical bills
in excess of $9,000 were also awarded.
The medical testimony, quoted at length by the court, was surprisingly in
agreement that the claimant did not suffer a classic "heart attack" but rather
suffered from "coronary insufficiency" as a result of the "strain." The
question was whether coronary insufficiency qualified as a condition creating
damage or harm to the physical structure of the body. The claimant's
expert testified that it did, while the carrier's expert testified, equivocally,
that it probably did not under the facts and circumstances of the claimant's
"injury." Based upon this testimony, the carrier contended that the claim-
ant's burden was to prove that he suffered damage to his heart muscle and
that the only evidence sufficient to meet this burden was evidence of a
myocardial infarction.
The court of civil appeals disagreed with this contention, stressing that the
statute' 8 2 defined injury as damage or harm to the physical structure of the
body. Relying upon a traumatic neurosis opinion by the supreme court 8 3
interpreting the phrase "physical structure of the body" to mean the entire
breathing, living, and functioning person, the court of civil appeals held that
damage to the physical structure of the body actually means that the
structure in question "no longer functions as it should"'1 4 or that there is
"impairment of use or control"' 8 5 of the physical structure. Satisfying itself
that coronary insufficiency produces an injury of some kind to the heart, the
court overruled the carrier's contentions as to the sufficiency of the evidence
on injury.
The court then turned to the real issue in the case-whether the "injury"
(coronary insufficiency) was a producing cause of the subsequent surgeries
and the total disability apparently stemming from the surgeries. The carrier
argued that the only evidence on the issue was the claimant's doctor's
181. Id. at 185.
182. Ch. 113, §§ 2-9, [1947] Tex. Laws 176-79 (repealed 1971). The definition of
injury in effect in 1970 is the same as that now in effect. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306, § 20 (Supp. 1975-76).
183. Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).




opinion based on medical possibility rather than medical probability. The
carrier's expert testified that the episode of August 13, 1970, was not a
producing cause for the surgeries. The episode simply precipitated the
claimant's going to the doctor for further evaluation. The claimant's doctor
testified that the incident did indeed cause the need for surgery and that such
surgery would not have occurred at that time if it had not been for the
incident. The court, without any enlightening discussion, simply held that
the testimony of the doctor created a fact issue to be decided by the jury.
The jury, therefore, was at liberty to believe whatever testimony it chose. In
a related attack, the carrier also raised a factual sufficiency argument on the
issue of whether the medical care associated with the surgeries (over
$9,000) was reasonably required as a result of the "injury." The court
attempted to bolster its anemic holding on this issue by citing various
opinions holding that disability resulting from medical treatment instituted to
cure the effects of an injury are compensable just as are the effects of the
original injury.' 86  While this statement is true, 1 7 it appears to be placing
the cart before the horse, or perhaps allowing the tail to wag the dog, and
certainly does nothing to solve the problem of whether the original "injury"
was a producing cause of the surgeries. Ultimately, the court simply held
that the testimony of the employee's doctor that the "injury" precipitated the
surgery and that without the "injury" he would not have had the surgery
when he did was sufficient evidence to uphold the jury verdict.
The issue in Thurmond concerning the payment of the medical bills for
open-heart surgery illustrates the complexities of heart attack and stroke
cases. The payment of these expenses by the employer's compensation
carrier seems somewhat unjust when present-day medical knowledge con-
cerning cardiology is considered. Obviously, Thurmond suffered the com-
mon disease of atherosclerosis which affects thousands of people in the
United States and is now thought to begin in early life.' 88 The causes of
occlusive heart disease are thought to be many and varied, 89 but in light
of the fact that individuals in all walks of life suffer from the disease, it
seems logical to conclude that Thurmond's heart disease certainly did not
result from nor was it aggravated by his employment or the "strain" suffered
in August 1970. Where, then, is the link connecting the heart surgery made
necessary by the long-standing atherosclerosis to Thurmond's employment?
What connection to the employment exists to justify charging the employer
and ultimately the consuming public' 90 with the expenses of a medical
problem suffered by thousands? The apparent answer from the Thurmond
court is because Thurmond suffered a "strain" in the course of his employ-
ment. This answer overlooks the fact that Thurmond's "injury" was no
more than a continuation of the coronary insufficiency symptoms that he
186. ld. at 190.
187. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
188. See HARRiSON'S PRINCnPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1225-36 (7th ed. 1974); E.
SAOALL & B. REED, THE HEART Am Tm LAw 407-24 (1968).
189. E. SAGALL & B. REED, supra note 188, at 419-23.
190. See notes 155, 156 supra and accompanying text.
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suffered for at least one year before his "injury" and the fact that his injury
was indeed no more than coronary insufficiency. The fact that this particu-
lar attack occurred on the job was fortuitous, but nonetheless, it established
the basis for compensability. Had the attack occurred a few hours before or
after the time that it did, at his home or while playing golf or straining at
stool, Thurmond would not have received compensation.
Reliance upon overexertion and strain as the only link to employment in
heart and stroke cases seems to encourage the fabrication of theories
designed to secure compensation, and it certainly encourages strained opin-
ions and tenuous results by the courts. Moreover, there is absolutely no
continuity of interpretation of facts nor any consistency of results in similar
cases. Overexertion has different meanings when applied to different
occupations. 191 The falacy of using overexertion as the link to employment
in heart and stroke cases lies in the rather obvious fact that in many
occupations what is considered usual exertion is enough to precipitate an
incident. In other occupations so little effort is required that if it exceeded
so as to constitute unusual effort, there certainly arises a common sense and
medical question as to whether the small effort involved actually precipitated
the incident. An employee whose job requires him to lift and load 100-
pound sacks all day long, week in and week out, is denied compensation
when he lifts a 50-pound mail sack because this is not overexertion for him,
but the office worker whose job requires no lifting is granted compensation
when he overexerts and picks up the same 50-pound mail sack. 192
The court-made overexertion test applies to heart attacks and strokes only.
It does not apply to any other physical injury to a structure of the body, even
though the process of disease and the mechanical process of injury are
exactly the same in many instances. For example, back injuries resulting in
disc herniation are compensable as long as they can be traced to a definite
time, place, and cause. Any cause will suffice. The cases involving back
injuries are legion. The mechanism of injury is varied and diverse, ranging
from simply twisting or bending over or lifting some object, to crush injuries
resulting from falls and objects falling on the employee. Everyone is
familiar with the story heard in many back injury cases-"I reached down to
pick up the box of feathers, and I had to twist, and I heard this pop and felt
something let go in my back." The mechanism of injury is never questioned
in back cases, and yet the disease process related to the intervertebral disc is
similar to that affecting the heart and the cerebral arteries. A herniated disc
"caused" by twisting, turning, bending, etc., is thought to be the end result of
a lifelong degenerative process, and the mechanical "cause" of the hernia-
tion, i.e., twisting, turning, bending, etc., is simply the "straw that breaks the
191. See, e.g., Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973);
O'Dell v. Home Indem. Co., 449 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Monks v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 425 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
192. See Gioscia v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 28 App. Div. 2d 1067, 284
N.Y.S.2d 149 (1967), and compare with Marlowe v. Huron Mountain Club, 271 Mich.
107, 260 N.W. 130 (1935).
[Vol. 30
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
camel's back.' .93  And so it is with atherosclerotic heart disease. 194  Yet,
compensation for these similar conditions is based on different legal require-
ments. In one, virtually no exertion is required; in the other, unusual
exertion is required. Is there a sound, logical difference?
The first time the supreme court was faced with a heart attack-stroke case
was in Carter v. Travelers Insurance Co.,195 wherein the court held a hotel
maid's cerebral vascular occlusion resulting from heavy work and overexer-
tion was compensable as an accident. The court gave no explanation for the
requirement. Since that time the phrase used to identify this extraordinary
proof requirement has normally been written as "strain and overexer-
tion."'196 Implicit in this phrase is the comparison of an employee's usual
exertion with the exertion causing the injury. ,If the injury causing exertion
is "unusual" under the facts and circumstances, the injury becomes compens-
able. 197  If there is no more than ordinary exertion, it is not compensa-
ble.' 93 In O'Dell v. Home Indemnity Co.'9 9 the court, without intending to
do so, articulated very precisely the problem inherent in the overexertion
test:
While the evidence presented here indicated that the work performed
by the deceased was normally strenuous, plaintiff [beneficiaries] pro-
duced no evidence that O'Dell's [employee's] heart attack was related
to or occasioned by any unusual strain or overexertion in O'Dell's
work. Evidence that the work performed by the deceased was stren-
uous, standing alone, is not sufficient. There must be a showing that
the deceased experienced strain or overexertion and further that there
was a causal connection between the strain or overexertion and the injury
complained of, being the fatal heart attack in this instance. Here there
was no evidence that O'Dell had performed any unusually strenuous
work on the day of his death.200
In none of the heart attack-stroke cases is there any hint of a reasonable
193. R. SPURLING, LESIONS OF THE LUMBAR INTERVERTEBRAL Disc 30-31 (1953); R.
SPURLING, LESIONS OF THE CERVICAL INTERVERTEBRAL Disc 44-45 (1956).
194. See HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 188, at 37-39;
E. SAGALL & B. REED, supra note 188, at 419-23.
195. 132 Tex. 288, 120 S.W.2d 581 (1938).
196. See, e.g., Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973);
Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972); Whitaker v.
General Ins. Co. of America, 461 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); O'Dell v. Home Indem. Co., 449 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bean v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 349 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Talmadge, 256 S.W.2d
945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n
v. Young, 231 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950, no writ).
197. See, e.g., Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973);
Carter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 288, 120 S.W.2d 581 (1938); Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Scruggs, 413 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ);
Midwestern Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 370 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Gant, 346 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1961, no writ).
198. See, e.g., Whitaker v. General Ins. Co. of America, 461 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); O'Dell v. Home Indem. Co., 449 S.W.2d 485 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Monks v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,
425 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
199. 449 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
200. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
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rationale for the overexertion distinction. It would seem that this court-
made requirement is the antithesis of the liberal construction required in
compensation cases. In actual practice, however, most courts strain credibil-
ity to find overexertion and some, as in Thurmond,20 1 seem to require only
meager evidence of strain without mentioning overexertion. Nevertheless,
the requirement still exists and uneven results continue to abound in the
reported cases. Perhaps the real reason for the distinction is found in
opinions in heart attack cases in New York and New Jersey.202  Both
formerly required unusual exertion in heart cases and both judicially de-
clared that the distinction was necessary because of the presumption that
death or injury from heart disease is ordinarily the result of natural
physiological causes rather than trauma or strenuous effort. Larson, analyz-
ing the reason for the distinction, has observed:
For while most of the law built up around the 'accident' requirement,
for example, has been based on false premises and embroidered with
irrelevant distinctions, there has been a utilitarian purpose behind it all
which cannot be disregarded when all the logical criticisms have been
exhausted. That practical consideration is the fear that the heart cases
and related types of injury and death will get out of control unless
some kind of arbitrary boundaries are set, and will become compensable
whenever they take place within the time and space limits of employ-
ment. Most states have chosen -to press the 'accident' concept into serv-
ice as one kind of arbitrary 'boundary, but, with a few exceptions, one
gets the impression that what is behind it all is not so much an insist-
ence on accidental quality for its own sake as the provisions of an added
assurance that compensation will not be awarded for deaths not really
caused in any substantial degree by the employment. 203
Based on current medical knowledge, the artificial boundaries created by
the courts for heart attack-stroke cases appear well founded and completely
justified. Unfortunately, the unusual exertion test is ill suited to its purport-
ed purpose of drawing the legal line. It is submitted that Professor Larson's
proposed rule for heart and related cases204 is the modem-day remedy to
the heart attack-stroke-back line drawing problem. Professor Larson sug-
gests that the essence of the problem is causation, which must be recognized
as a two-part questin-(l) legal causation and (2) medical causation:
Under the legal -test, the law must define what kind of exertion satis-
fies the test of 'arising out of the employment.'
Under the medical test, the doctors must say whether the exertion
(having been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in fact
caused this collapse.
All too often these two tests are scrambled together. When this hap-
pens, the effect is usually that one is lost sight of. Thus, . . . obsession
201. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Thurmond, 527 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
202. Kayser v. Erie County Highway Dep't, 276 App. Div. 789, 92 N.Y.S.2d 612,
613 (1949); Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 13 N.J. Super. 56, 80 A.2d 235 (1951), rev'd,
8 N.J. 586, 86 A.2d 577 (1952).
203. 1A A. LARSON, supra note 42, § 38.81, at 7-166.
204. Id. § 38.83, at 7-169 to -202.
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with the legal test of unusual exertion may lead to a holding that a
very slight exertion, because it satisfies the legal test in being unusual
for this employee, is adequate to support an award, although its ability
medically to account for the collapse seems remote. Conversely, obses-
sion with medical causation sometimes leads to a slighting of the need
for precision in defining the legal rule, with the result that decisions
may be based on statements by doctors that the exertion did or did not
cause the heart attack, although neither the doctors nor the lawyers may
have had a clear and consistent concept of what 'caused' meant in this
setting. 205
Professor Larson argues for the adoption of a rule based upon his well-
known positional risk doctrine. This doctrine, in situations not involving any
personal, non-occupational risk element, argues for the acceptance of any
actual risk arising from the employment, even to the extent that the
employment merely puts the employee in the place where the injury, from a
neutral force, occurred, because it is greater than the zero employee
contribution. 20 6 But when the employee contributes some personal element
to the risk, i.e., a personal enemy or a personal disease, then the employment
must contribute something substantial to increase the risk, the reasoning
being that the employment must offset the causal contribution of the
personal risk. 20 7 As applied to heart cases the rule would be:
If there is some personal causal contribution in the form of a pre-
viously weakened or diseased heart, the employment contribution must
take the form of an exertion greater than that of nonemployment life.
... Note that the comparison is not with this employee's usual exertion
in his employment but with the exertions of normal nonemployment
life of this or any other person.
If there is no personal causal contribution, that is, if there is no prior
weakness or disease, any exertion connected with the employment and
causally connected with the collapse as a matter of medical fact is ade-
quate to satisfy the legal test of causation. This is the heart case applica-
tion of the actual risk test: this exertion in fact causally contributed to
this collapse.
In both situations, with or without prior personal weakness or dis-
ease, the claimant must also show that medically the peculiar exertion
contributed causally to the heart attack.
To develop the parallel between idiopathic fall and heart cases a little
further: note first that they resemble each other in that the personal
weakness is often quantitatively the larger factor in both. In a typical
idiopathic fall case, the personal weakness asserts itself first, in the
form of a heart attack, and the employment element is then added in
the form of contact with the floor. In a typical exertion-heart case, the
employment element comes first in the form of work exertion, and the
personal element second, in the form of a heart attack from the exer-
tion.
Now suppose this comparison. A man has a diseased heart.
(1) He has a heart attack and hit his head on the ground-the
205. Id. at7-170to-171.
206. Id. §§ 8.43, 9.40.
207. Id. §§ 11.23, 12.10-.14.
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same ground that supports all creatures on earth, and makes
claim for the head injury.
(2) He is standing motionless waiting for an elevator and has a
heart attack, and makes claim for the heart attack.
The parallel is that (even if we assume that a doctor might have
testified in the second case that the effort of standing contributed to the
heart attack) there is nothing in either case added to everyday nonem-
ployment life, and therefore, since the personal causal element stands
alone, there is nothing to satisfy the legal causal requirement.
20 8
Under Professor Larson's proposed rule, the employee whose job requires
the lifting of 200-pound sacks and whose lifting of one such 200-pound sack
medically produces a heart attack would receive compensation, even in the
presence of a history of heart disease, because people generally do not lift
200-pound weights as a part of nonemployment life and, therefore, the
episode would not be ascribed to the ordinary wear and tear of life. Under
the unusual-exertion rule, there would be no compensation regardless of
previous heart condition because the employee did not exceed the usual
exertion required by his job.209 On the other hand, the office worker who
is not required to do any lifting lifts a 20-pound weight and produces medical
evidence that this lifting caused a heart attack. Under the old test, primarily
concerned with the comparison between usual exertion and unusual exertion,
the employee would receive compensation. Under Professor Larson's rule,
the result would depend on whether there was a personal causal element in
the form of a previously weakened heart. If there was not, compensation
would be awarded since the employment contributed something and the
employee's personal life contributed nothing. If there was previous heart
disease, however, compensation should be denied in spite of the medical
testimony because, legally, the personal causal contribution was substantial
while the employment added nothing to the usual wear and tear of life, since
the employee's nonoccupational exertions certainly include lifting objects
weighing 20 pounds, e.g., golf clubs, trash cans, etc. 210
Larson's proposal has been criticized on the ground that current medical
opinion holds that heart attacks are rare in the absence of long-standing
atherosclerotic arterial disease and, therefore, singling out pre-existing dis-
ease cases for special treatment would be unfair and of doubtful validity. 211
This criticism does not appear valid if the real purpose of compensation law
and theory is considered-care and treatment of injuries and diseases arising
out of and originating in the employment. 21 2  Larson responds to this
criticism by pointing out that the original proposal 218 did indeed take this
medical opinion into account. 214 He then writes:
208. Id. § 38.83, at 7-172.
209. Id. at 7-173.
210. Id. at 7-174.
211. See 32 J. AM. TRiAL LAW. ASS'N 427, 439 (1968).
212. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v.
Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963).
213. Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and
Suggested Solution, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 441 (1967).
214. Id. at 473.
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But the consequence of this fact [medical opinion] is merely that in
almost all cases the test will be comparison with nonemployment life.
Since... this is the soundest and fairest comparison to make when the
object is to distinguish work-connected collapses from those that are
due to normal progression of a disease, the fact that this comparison
would become the normal one should be a point in its favor.
The criticism also slights a crucial distinction that is familiar at many
points where law and medicine intersect. Medical theory is one thing;
a legal record on appeal is another. It is not at all uncommon for a
record to arrive before an appellate court showing that a man with no
prior history of heart disease suffered a coronary occlusion or myo-
cardial infarction. What is the Court supposed to do? Shall it say that,
although there is no evidence in the record of heart disease, it will sup-
ply that fact by judicial notice, because the preponderance of medical
theory holds that the man must have had pre-existing heart disease?
But this may actually contradict the record, which may contain 'undis-
puted testimony that the man was healthy and had no previous history
of heart disease.
The legal answer is that the determination of pre-existing heart di-
sease is one of medical fact in the particular case, and that the burden
of proof of that fact is on the party alleging its existence as part of his
case.
215
The second half of the proposed rule involves the presently accepted
requirement of medical evidence that the exertion contributed causally to the
injury. 216 This requirement is already familiar and only reiterates the
distinction between the normal progression of a disease resulting in a
fortuitous occurrence on the job and an injury causally related to the
employment.
While the primary thrust of Professor Larson's proposal is directed to
heart cases, there does not appear to be any valid reason why this proposal
cannot provide a rule of general application, and, more importantly, practi-
cality, to any physical injury case, especially back injuries. Such use of this
rule is advocated by Larson. 217
Some may say that the proposed rule does not take into account the
specific wording of the Texas statute21 s defining injury to include aggrava-
tion of a pre-existing disease or injury. It is suggested, however, that the
aggravation doctrine is indeed viable and applicable in the use of the Larson
215. IA A. LARSON, supra note 42, § 38.83, at 7-181 to -183.
216. Id. at 7-188 to -202.
217. Id. at 7-183 to -185.
inhere are cases on the books that make one wonder whether the cere-
bral hemorrhage or disc protrusion might not have been just as much the
result of natural progression as any coronary thrombosis. For example,
awards for cerebral hemorrhage have been made based on such activities
as filling prescriptions, and sweeping lint; 'even slight exertion' has been
said to suffice. As to disc cases . . . [there was] the award for a disc
herniation attributed to the truck driver's act of lifting his foot from the
brake pedal. It might be difficult to call this an exertion beyond the
ordinary wear and tear of life, although if the case were presented as one
in which the total strain of truck driving surpassed that of nonemployment
life, the matter might appear in a different light.
Id. at 7-183 to -184.
218. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Supp. 1975-76).
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rule. The primary inquiry is causation, i.e., what factor in the employment
caused or aggravated the pre-existing atherosclerotic disease, degenerative
disc disease, etc.? This inquiry is from both the legal and medical point of
view. If the disease is aggravated, legally and medically, by exertion greater
than that in ordinary nonemployment life, the injury is compensable;
otherwise, it is not compensable.
One reason for the poor performance of the current Texas overexertion
doctrine in recent years has been the special issues submitted in many heart
attack cases. The issues have been taken from Texas Pattern Jury
Charges.2 19  The heart attack issues suggested by the Committee, and
apparently approved by several courts, 220 consist of an issue inquiring
whether the claimant suffered an injury (heart attack)221 and an issue
directed to what is designated as a course and scope question,222 but what
should more accurately be designated as the "arising out of and originating
in the employment" 223 issue, i.e., the causal link to the employment. The
suggested Pattern Jury Charge issue reads as follows:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff had
such heart attack in the course of his employment by A.B.C. Company?
A heart attack is in the course of employment if it is produced or pre-
cipitated by an employee's work or the conditions of his employment.
Otherwise, a heart attack is not in the course of employment, even if
it occurs on the job. 224
The obvious defect in this issue is the fact that it incorrectly defines what
is known to be the absolute minimum criterion for a compensable heart
attack-overexertion and strain.2 25  In view of the well-established, court-
made requirement of overexertion, the issue should be submitted by inquir-
ing whether "a particular strain, overexertion or shock '" 22 6 caused the injury.
Interestingly, a distinguished member of the Texas Trial Lawyers' Associa-
tion unequivocally and without questioning its validity, provides the element
of overexertion in a suggested jury charge in a heart attack death case. 227 It
is submitted that whether the issues are general with instructions, as in the
Texas Pattern Jury Charges short form,228 or whether they are specific
219. 2 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES §§ 20.02, 21.11, 29.02,29.04 (1970).
220. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Thurmond, 527 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Continental Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 506
S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ).
221. 2 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 20.02 (1970). Proposed issue 20.02, which
is the same as 29.02 proposed for use in a death case, provides: "Do you find from
a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff had a heart attack on or about January
17, 1970?"
222. Id. § 21.11. Proposed issue 29.04 for use in a death case is exactly the same
as 21.11.
223. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967).
224. 2 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 21.11 (1970).
225. See cases cited notes 196-98 supra and accompanying text.
226. Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex. 1973); Olson
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. 1972).
227. Peery, Recovery of Death Benefits Under the Texas Workmen's Compensation
Law, 9 TRIAL LAw. F., April-June 1975, at 20, 23.
228. 2 TExAs PATTERN JURY CHARGES 7-11 (1970).
[Vol. 30
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
issues as proposed in the text of Texas Pattern Jury Charges,229 the terms
"overexertion" or "strain" must be included. Moreover, in order properly to
submit what seems to be the current Texas law (at least in theory), a
definition of overexertion should be given which includes the underlying
thesis for the theory of heart attack-stroke compensation, i.e., comparison of
the normal exertion required in the employment to the alleged overexertion
or strain causing the injury.230  As previously indicated, however, the
clumsy overexertion approach appears to foster strained, convoluted results
lacking in any degree of consistency. Thus, adoption of the Larson test is
favored over the continued use of the overexertion theory, even if submitted
properly.
Death Claim--Gross Negligence. In Delgadillo v. Tex-Con Utility Contrac-
tors Inc.231 suit was brought to recover exemplary damages pursuant to
section 5 of article 8306.232 Plaintiffs alleged several acts of active and
passive gross negligence. Plaintiffs appealed an adverse jury verdict, con-
tending that the trial court erred in refusing to submit a number of special
issues concerned with the employer's failure to do certain acts. 233 The court
of civil appeals rejected the contention, holding that there was no evidence of
gross negligence as a matter of law. Relying on the landmark case of
Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones,234 the court noted that gross negligence consists
of positive or affirmative acts as opposed to merely passive or negative acts
and must be "something just short of intentional wrongdoing. '235 The court
affirmed the judgment in favor of the employer after reviewing the evidence
and finding that Tex-Con had affirmatively undertaken a number of safety
precautions for the protection of the employees, thereby rebutting the
conscious disregard element of gross negligence. Moreover, the court found
a complete lack of evidence to demonsrate that the employer knew of the
dangers and consciously failed or neglected to take precautions. 238
Suits Against Nonsubscribers. Increasing premium escalation, associated
with expanding compensation coverage and the increasing cost of benefits,
makes the nonsubscriber statute an attractive alternative to complete com-
pensation coverage. A nonsubscriber is subject to suit for all damages
229. Id. § § 21.11, 29.04; see Peery, supra note 227, at 23.
230. A possible issue and instruction, similar to the Pattern Jury Charge issue on
course and scope of employment (21.11 and 29.04), could be phrased as follows:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff had such
heart attack as a result of overexertion or strain in the course and scope of
his employment for A.B.C. Company?
You are instructed that overexertion or strain producing damage or
harm to the physical structure of the body is considered to be an injury in
the course of employment if you find that such overexertion or strain ex-
ceeded the usual and customary exertion or strain required in the plain-
tiff's employment at the time of the injury, if any.
231. 526 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
232. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (1967).
233. These issues are quoted by the court. 526 S.W.2d at 210.
234. 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964).
235. 526 S.W.2d at 210, quoting Woolard v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., 479 F.2d 557, 565
(5th Cir. 1973).
236. 526 S.W.2d at 211, citing Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Robertson, 125 Tex.
4,79 S.W.2d 830 (1935).
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suffered by an employee injured in the scope of his employment and all
common law defenses are waived, but the employee must prove negligence
on the part of the employer. 23 7 Two cases during this survey year involved
one of the largest employers electing to be a nonsubscriber-J. Weingarten,
Inc. In Moore v. Weingarten, Inc. 238 the employee slipped on a grape in
an aisle near the produce counter where grapes were displayed for sale.
There was no evidence that the employer knew the grape was on the floor,
placed it on the floor, or that it had been on the floor long enough to put the
employer on notice. The jury failed to find the employer guilty of any
negligence proximately causing the employee's injuries. On appeal, the
employee did not attack the jury findings, but contended that the trial court
erred in failing to submit an issue inquiring if the employer failed to exercise
ordinary care to inspect, discover, and remove the grape from the floor. In
affirming the take-nothing judgment the court of civil appeals noted that the
duty of a landowner to make his premises safe is analogous to the duty of an
employer to provide his employees with a safe place to work.23 9 Such being
the case, the court analogized the duty to furnish an employee a safe place to
work, in a situation involving a foreign substance, to the ordinary "slip and
fall" cases. Relying upon numerous slip and fall cases, the court found no
evidence that the grape had been on the floor for a sufficient length of time
that it would have been discovered and removed by the employer had he
exercised ordinary care.
The employee's second point on appeal was unique. The employee
complained of the trial court's action in sustaining special exceptions to a
pleading invoking a theory of products liability as a ground of recovery. It
was candidly admitted that the reason for invoking strict liability was to
obviate the necessity of proving negligence on the part of the employer.
Under a products theory, of course, the employee could rely upon a defect
in the employer's product which made it unreasonably dangerous to the user,
consumer, or bystander. The evidence supporting this theory, according to
the employee, was the fact that the grapes were sold unpackaged, and this
failure to package created an unreasonably dangerous condition to consum-
ers and bystanders. As the court of civil appeals noted, probably tongue in
cheek, neither party was able to cite a single case from any jurisdiction
which had held that a fresh eatable grape, even on the floor of a supermar-
ket, constituted a defective product which was unreasonably dangerous.
Refusing to decide if product liability law could be applicable to an
employee's suit against his employer, the court held that the strict provisions
of the statute240 required proof of negligence against the employer in order
to sustain recovery.241 Thus, the take-nothing judgment in favor of the
employer was affirmed.
237. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 1,4 (1967).
238. 523 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
239. Id. at 447, citing Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567
(Tex. 1972), and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Robinson, 154 Tex. 336, 280 S.W.2d 238(1955).
240. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 4 (1967).
241. 523 S.W.2d at 449.
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In Weingarten, Inc. v. Higginbotham242 the same court of civil appeals
affirmed a judgment in favor of the employee. The jury found the employer
negligent for failing to provide the employee with a ladder or other means to
remove bacon from a high stack in a meat cooler and further found the
employer negligent for stacking the bacon in the manner in which it was
stacked. The court overruled the employer's no evidence and insufficient
evidence attack but did allow the employer credit for sums previously paid to
the plaintiff.243
Wrongful Discharge or Discrimination. A 1971 amendment to the Compen-
sation Act provided that an employer could not discharge or in any manner
discriminate against any employee because the employee, in good faith, filed
a compensation claim, hired an attorney to represent him, or instituted, in
good faith, any proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, or
because he testified or was about to testify in any compensation proceeding.
The statute provides for "reasonable damages" and reinstatement to the
former employment if the employee has been discharged in violation of the
statute. 244 The first appellate interpretation of this amendment occurred in
1974 in Swanson v. American Manufacturing Co. 245  During this survey
year, three cases involved this portion of the statute, but the courts found it
unnecessary actually to interpret the specific provisions of this article.
Nonetheless, two of the opinions are interesting and instructive. 246
In Brown v. Brookside Division of Safeway Stores, Inc. 247 the employee
alleged wrongful discharge. It is not clear from the opinion if the employ-
ee's action was brought pursuant to the provisions of article 8307c. Never-
theless, the employer's motion for summary judgment was granted on the
basis that the employee had failed to comply with the terms of a written
contract between his union and the employer and, therefore, had failed to
exhaust the remedies afforded to him under the contract, thereby making the
suit premature.
The court of civil appeals affirmed. The summary judgment evidence
disclosed that plaintiff was terminated for absenteeism and had filed a
grievance but that the grievance was denied. The contract provided for
arbitration, but the employee never requested arbitration. The court held,
relying upon a number of cases, 248 that the contract represented the exclusive
method for redress by the employee, and failure to exhaust the grievance
242. 523 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
243. Id. at 453.
244. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Supp. 1975-76).
245. 511 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), reviewed
in Sartwelle, supra note 2, at 198.
246. The third case, Fernandez v. Reynolds Metals Co., 384 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D. Tex.
1974), involved the issue of whether an employee's action pursuant to article 8307c
could be removed to federal court. Upon the employee's motion to remand the federal
district court held that the cause of action was one being asserted under the state work-
men's compensation statute and the removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1970)) specif-
ically prohibited the removal of such a case to the federal courts.
247. 517 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ).
248. See cases cited id. at 620.
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procedures prevented the maintenance of a suit to litigate the same contro-
versy. 249
In Lewis v. Republic National Bank250 the employee filed suit asserting
wrongful discharge pursuant to article 8307c. The employer's motion for
summary judgment was granted. The evidence disclosed that the employee
settled a compensation claim arising from an injury sustained in the course of
his employment. In concluding the settlement the employee and his attor-
ney signed what the court of civil appeals denominated "an agreement for
judgment." A portion of the agreement is quoted by the court.251  In
summary, the employee agreed to release all of his claims under the Texas
Employers' Liability Act, or at common law, against his employer and the
employer's compensation carrier, arising prior to the execution of the
agreement. In opposition to the summary judgment the employee filed an
affidavit wherein he asserted that he did not intend to release his employer
from any cause of action for wrongful termination, and that the use of the
term "Employers' Liability Act" was ambiguous. The court of civil appeals,
based on summary judgment rules, held that the employee's affidavit created
a fact issue and, therefore, reversed the judgment of the trial court and re-
manded the case for trial.
Both Brown and Lewis deserve careful study by all concerned, especially
in view of the increasing frequency with which discrimination suits are filed.
One question raised by the suits filed under article 8307c, apparently not yet
litigated, is whether the standard Texas Workmen's Compensation and
Employers' Excess Liability Policy provides coverage to employers for
actions against them under this article. The determination of this question
may well affect compensation premium structure.
Extraterritorial Injuries. Article 8306, section 19252 provides compensation
coverage for employees hired in Texas, but who sustain injury, in the course
of employment, outside of the state. The subtleties of the statute have been
construed many times by the supreme court.258 The Waco court of civil
appeals had occasion to reconsider this well-established law in Renner v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 25 4  There, claimant was a journeyman
ironworker residing in Dallas, Texas, and a member of a Local Ironworkers'
Union in Dallas through which he secured employment with numerous
different employers. On the occasion in question he was employed through
the union by American Bridge Division of United States Steel to work on the
Superdome in New Orleans. American Bridge agreed to pay travel time
and transportation expenses from Dallas to New Orleans and back to Dallas.
The claimant began working in New Orleans but was injured on the second
working day and returned to Dallas. The claimant testified, however, that
249. 517 S.W.2d at 620.
250. 528 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
251. Id. at 636.
252. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (1967).
253. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Dossey, 402 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1966);
Hale v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150 Tex. 215, 239 S.W.2d 608 (1951); Southern
Underwriters v. Gallagher, 135 Tex. 41, 136 S.W.2d 590 (1940).
254. 516 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ).
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he intended to complete the job in Louisiana, collect his travel- time, return
to Dallas, and secure another job through his union. The trial court granted
the carrier's motion for summary judgment, which action was affirmed by
the court of civil appeals.
The Waco court reviewed the many Texas cases construing section 19,
noting that it is well established that the phrase "who has been hired in this
State" 255 does not refer to the place where the contract of hiring is made.
The primary question is whether the employee is hired within this state to
perform services solely within another state or within another state and
Texas. If hired to perform work in Texas as well as another state, he is a
Texas employee regardless of whether he begins work in the other state. 256
In Renner it was without dispute that the claimant, although hired in Texas,
was employed to work only outside of the State of Texas during the term of
the contract in question. It was established, therefore, as a matter of law,
that he never occupied the status of a Texas employee. Thus, the court held
that even though the employee had worked for this same employer in Texas
in the past, and even though he anticipated working for the same employer
in Texas in the future, these facts had no bearing on the contract in question
because a severance of the employee-employer relationship terminates the
employee's status as a Texas employee.2 57 Nor did the payment of travel
time and transportation expenses from Dallas bring the employee within the
extraterritorial provisions of the Compensation Act. 258
III. PROCEDURAL LAW
Out-of-Court Statements of Doctors as Admissions Against the Carrier. The
Waco court of civil appeals, in Thomas v. International Insurance Co., 259
has held that unsworn, out-of-court statements by doctors paid by the carrier
to examine and treat an employee are admissible against the carrier, to prove
the truth of the matters stated, under the admissions of a party exception to
the hearsay rule. A comment on this holding may properly be assigned to
the procedural law-evidence commentator, but this far-reaching holding
deserves critical analysis.
In Thomas the claimant was injured in December 1970.260 He was sent
to a doctor by his attorney after his foreman refused him permission to go to
the company doctor. Subsequently, the carrier secured an Industrial Acci-
dent Board order for an examination by a Dr. Luedtke. After receiving Dr.
Luedtke's initial report, the carrier's claims adjuster authorized an EMG
upon Dr. Luedtke's recommendation. The EMG was performed by a Dr.
Crane, and a report, indicating nerve root irritation, was sent to Dr. Luedtke,
who in turn sent another written report to the carrier recommending
255. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (1967).
256. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Dossey, 402 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1966).
257. See Hale v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150 Tex. 215, 239 S.W.2d 608 (1951).
258. 516 S.W.2d at 241, and cases cited.
259. 527 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
260. The injury occured prior to the amendment to TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
8306, § 7 (Supp. 1975-76), which allowed the employee, not the carrier, the sole right
to select the physician or facility to render medical treatment as a result of an injury.
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hospitalization. Subsequently, the carrier requested an examination by a
Dr. Sanders, a neurosurgeon, who examined the claimant and arranged to
hospitalize him. The carrier, however, refused to be financially responsible
for the hospital bill. Approximately three years later the carrier approved
treatment by a Dr. Cotton, but when the doctor requested permission to
hospitalize the claimant, the carrier again refused responsibility. Subse-
quently, the carrier's claims manager wrote the doctor denying that any
authorization had been given for the employee's treatment and denied
responsibility for any medical bills. At trial, the claimant offered as
evidence the fact that the carrier "employed" and authorized Drs. Luedtke,
Crane, and Sanders to treat him for his injuries, and that all of these
physicians recommended hospitalization. Also offered in evidence were
conversations between the claimant and Dr. Luedtke and the claimant and
Dr. Sanders to the effect that he needed to be hospitalized for treatment of
his injuries. Also offered was a written report from Dr. Luedtke to the
carrier recommending hospitalization. The claimant also sought to prove
that the carrier authorized treatment by Dr. Cotton but later repudiated the
agreement and refused to pay the doctor for his services. This evidence was
tendered on a bill of exception since the trial court excluded the testimony.
On appeal the claimant contended that all of the evidence was admissible
"under an exception to the hearsay rule." The Waco court agreed, presum-
ably, although not clear from the opinion, because the written and oral
statements constituted admissions of a party opponent. The precise holding
of the court was as follows:
Plaintiff -tendered all this evidence in the trial to the effect that these
doctors [Luedtke, Crane and Sanders] employed by Defendant had rec-
ommended that Plaintiff be hospitalized. The trial court excluded this
testimony. This was error. These doctors, having been employed and
authorized by Defendant to examine Plaintiff, were the agents of De-
fendant. Therefore, any out-of-court statements made by these doctors,
written or oral, to the effect that Plaintiff should be hospitalized, were
admissible against the Defendant Insurance Company as an exception
to the hearsay rule. These statements made by these doctors regarding
the physical condition of Plaintiff were admissible.261
As authority for this holding, the court cited Texas Employers' Insur-
ance Ass'n v. Dimsdale,2 62 and Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Jordan,26 3 a
1961 no writ history opinion by the same Waco court of civil appeals. An
examination of the court's cited authority as well as the authorities cited by
these courts reveals that they furnish absolutely no support for this holding
by the court.
,In the Dimsdale case the carrier admitted that it retained the services of
Drs. Patterson and Richardson to treat the employee and paid these doctors
for their professional services as well as receiving medical reports from them.
The trial court allowed the employee to testify that Dr. Patterson told him to
261. 527 S.W.2d at 818 (emphasis added).
262. 440 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
263. 351 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, no writ).
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return to work, but that Dr. Richardson told him he was the primary doctor,
and he would tell the employee when he could go back to work. In holding
these statements admissible as "an exception to the hearsay rule," the Dallas
court wrote:
It is quite clear that the statements of Dr. Richardson were made by
him to appellee [employee] as a part of his professional duties in con-
nection with examining and taking care of Appellee. He was employed
by appellant [carrier] to do this very thing. The identical contention as
now asserted by appellant was expressly overruled by the Austin Court
of Civil Appeals in the recent case of Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co. v.
Morris, 420 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App., Austin 1967, writ ref'd
n.r.e. ).264
The Austin court's opinion in Argonaut Southwest Insurance Co. v.
Morris2 65 was the only case cited by the Dimsdale court as authority for its
holding. In Morris the carrier requested Dr. Simms to examine the claim-
ant. At some point in time, the employer sent the claimant to a Dr. Paulsen.
Both of these doctors apparently referred the claimant to a Dr. Farris, who
sent medical reports to the carrier. The case was tried to the court without a
jury, and the court allowed the employee to testify at length regarding
conversations with Drs. Simms and Farris concerning his physical condition.
The carrier's hearsay objections were overruled. The Austin court affirmed
the admission of this evidence on the specific ground that the statements
were in the nature of admissions against interest admissible against a
principal when made by an agent within the scope of his duties. This is the
first holding in this series of cases specifically designating the particular
exception to the hearsay rule making these statements admissible. The
Austin court wrote:
It is quite true that unsworn, out of court statements made by doctors
with reference to the physical conditions of their patients is hearsay
and inadmissible. . . . It is equally true that such statements in the na-
ture of admissions against interest are admissible against a principal
when made by an agent within the scope of his duties. 266
The admissions and testimony are sufficient to support -an implied
finding that the doctors named were agents of appellant. It is our
opinion that -the statements made by these doctors regarding the physi-
cal condition of appellee were admissible. See, Vineyard v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Association, 263 S.W.2d 675, Tex. Civ. App. Dallas,
writ ref. n.r.e.; Bituminous Casualty Corporation v. Jordan, 351 S.W.2d
559, Tex. Civ. App. Waco, n.w.h.
An analysis of the only two cases cited as authority by the Morris court
reveals that these opinions dealt with entirely different factual circumstances
and furnish absolutely no support for the court's holding that the doctors
became the agents of the insurance carrier. In Bituminous Casualty Corp.
v. Jordan,267 one of the cases cited by the Thomas court, the claimant was
264. 440 S.W.2d at 365-66.
265. 420 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
266. Id. at 763.
267. 351 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, no writ).
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allowed to testify concerning a statement made by a doctor for the limited
purpose of showing that the statement was indeed made by that doctor and
relied upon by the claimant as good cause for late filing. After his injury,
the claimant, a minor, was told by the carrier's adjuster that the company
would take care of everything. Later, the adjuster requested the minor
claimant to see a plastic surgeon, and arrangements were made for a surgical
procedure. Although the surgery was never accomplished, the minor claim-
ant was allowed to testify, over a hearsay objection, that the plastic surgeon
selected by the carrier "prescribed plastic surgery." This testimony was
offered for the limited purpose of rebutting the claims adjuster's testimony
regarding his dealings with the minor claimant. The Waco court held that
admission of this testimony did not present reversible error because the
carrier made no motion to strike, the question having been answered before
the objection was made. Moreover, the court pointed out that the adjuster
testified that the plastic surgeon sent him a report suggesting plastic surgery.
There was also evidence, admitted without objection, concerning the adjus-
ter's failure to notify the minor claimant concerning the planned operation
and the failure of the carrier to proceed with the operation. The trial court,
at the carrier's request, had instructed the jury that the adjuster's testimony
concerning discussions with the claimant about plastic surgery was not to be
considered on the question of whether the claimant needed plastic surgery
but only for the purpose of showing his dealings with the claimant. Accord-
ingly, it is obvious that the Jordan case simply stands for the proposition that
the carrier failed to timely object to the hearsay answer and made no motion
to strike, thereby waiving any error. It also stands for the proposition that if
it was error to admit such testimony, the carrier actually waived the harmful
effect of the error by allowing other evidence on the same subject to be
admitted. This opinion, having no writ history, does not stand for the
proposition that the plastic surgeon became the agent of the carrier and that
hearsay conversations with the plastic surgeon are admissible as admissions
against the carrier.
The Morris court's second cited authority was Vineyard v. Texas Employ-
ers' Insurance Ass'n.268 This opinion is even less relevant to the issue than
the Jordan opinion. Vineyard was a suit to set aside a compromise
settlement agreement for alleged fraud in the procurement of the settlement.
The trial court instructed a verdict in favor of the carrier, and the claimant
appealed. The evidence revealed that the claimant underwent a pre-
employment physical examination by a Dr. Brown who was associated with a
clinic regularly used by the employer for all medical and surgical work. After
his injury, the employee was again examined by Dr. Brown who was still
connected with the same clinic. The employee testified that Dr. Brown told
him that he had a minor injury that would clear up within three or four
weeks. Subsequently, the carrier's claims adjuster used a report from Dr.
Brown, indicating that the injury was trivial, in order to secure a $75
compromise settlement agreement. The claimant testified that he relied
268. 263 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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upon the statement by Dr. Brown as well as the written report in making the
settlement and testified that he would not have entered into the settlement
agreement if Dr. Brown had not made statements about his condition. Later,
the employee underwent a spinal fusion by another doctor.
The court of civil appeals held that under the evidence the carrier was
charged with the correctness of the statements made by Dr. Brown when it
used such statements in making the settlement, and that the evidence raised
an issue for the jury concerning the correctness of the statements. The court
specifically noted that the doctor was not the agent of the employee or the
carrier but of the employer. Nevertheless, since the carrier used the doctor's
statements to influence the settlement, to the employee's damage, the court
held that the carrier in effect adopted these statements and made these
statements binding on the carrier insofar as the settlement with the employee
was concerned. The court wrote:
After reviewing the authorities, we are of the opinion -that .the doctor
was not the agent of Vineyard, but was the agent of the employer, and
when the agent of the insurance company used the doctor's statement,
it was charged with the truthfulness of such a statement in that it was
a representation to Vineyard as to his condition.
It therefore follows that since the evidence raised jury issues on the
pleaded issue of legal fraud in procurement of the settlement agree-
ment, that the Court's instruction was in error.269
Although not noted by the Vineyard court, the doctor's statements were
probably not hearsay since they were apparently introduced into evidence to
demonstrate the state of mind of the employee at the time of the compromise
settlement agreement. 270  Regardless of the theory of admissibility, it is
obvious that the Vineyard court's specific holding was only that the carrier
was chargeable with the truthfulness of statements that it adopted from an
agent of the employer. There is no holding that the doctor was the agent of
the carrier for purposes of the admissions exception to the hearsay rule.
The court in Thomas not only relied upon erroneous authority as demon-
strated by the above tracing of the history of the alleged authority, but it also
ignored the supreme court's recent holding in Big Mack Trucking Co. v.
Dickerson.2 71 In Big Mack the court was concerned with the admission into
evidence of hearsay statements made by an employee of Big Mack. Imme-
diately after a truck accident, the employee made a statement to the
investigating police officer concerning the occurrence of the accident and
subsequently made additional statements to a vice-president of Big Mack.
Both of these statements were allowed into evidence. The supreme court,
however, held that the admission of these hearsay statements was error.
Regarding the employee's statements to the employer's vice-president, the
court held that the trial judge must find, as a preliminary fact, that the
statements were authorized by the employer. The court noted that it is very
269. Id. at 680.
270. See 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 796 (2d ed. 1956).
271. 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973).
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likely that the principal intends the agent's report to be made only to the
principal or other persons investigating the accident for the principal and not
to the whole world. Since there were no special facts demonstrating that Big
Mack authorized its employee to speak to the world, the court held that it
was error to allow the introduction of such statements into evidence.
With respect to the admission of the employee's statements to the investi-
gating police officer, the court noted that it must first be found that such
statements were authorized by the employer either expressly or impliedly
from express authority to perform other acts. The particular question raised
was whether the employee's express authority to operate a truck could be
made the basis for implied authority to explain how an accident occurred. As
noted by the supreme court, most authorities take the position that a driver's
statements after an accident are not authorized by his employer.27 2 As the
court suggested, the well-advised employer would generally not authorize the
driver to speak in circumstances involving potential liability as a result of an
accident.278
Ignoring for the moment the problem of whether an independent practi-
tioner of the healing arts becomes an agent of an insurance carrier simply
because he performs a medical examination, it seems ludicrous that the
Thomas court so flippantly holds that a doctor is authorized to make
admissions on behalf of an insurance carrier when the supreme court finds it
unbelievable that a trucking company would allow its employee to make
binding statements regarding a vehicle accident. Certainly, it is no more
realistic to believe that "the well advised employer would generally not
authorize the" 274 employee "to speak" 275 for him concerning the cause of
an accident than it is to believe that an insurance carrier seeking an
independent medical examination would generally not authorize the physi-
cian to bind it by purported statements to a claimant asserting a money
damage claim against the carrier. More importantly, however, it seems that
Thomas simply assumes an agency relationship without requiring any proof
of the essential elements of agency. An agent with express or implied
authority to bind his principal by his statements is denominated a speak-
ing agent.27" The test of admissibility of an agent's statements against
his principal is the same as the principal's substantive responsibility for the
acts of the agent.2 77  Moreover, the party offering the alleged agent's
statement must first prove the fact and scope of the agency of the alleged
agent. 278 The Restatement (Second) of Agency recognizes that an inde-
pendent contractor who contracts to accomplish a physical result for another,
but who is not acting as a fiduciary and is not under the supervision of the
272. See cases cited id. at 288.
273. Id. This opinion has invited strong criticism of several of its holdings. See
Elliot, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 158 (1973); Note, Admissi-
bility Against Employer of Hearsay Evidence of Employee's Negligence, 11 Hous. L.
REV. 481 (1974).
274. 497 S.W.2d at 288.
275. Id.
276. Note, supra note 273, at 485 & n.31.
277. Id. & n.32.




person employing him to produce the result is a non-agent, independent
contractor. 27 9 Neither Thomas nor any of its cited authority required any
evidence of the fact or the scope of the alleged agency on the part of the
doctor. The court merely asserted that the agency existed as if such
assertion would make it so. It is submitted, however, that regardless of any
such assertions, a physician retained by a carrier to perform a medical
examination requiring specialized skill and training has contracted to "ac-
complish physical results not under the supervision" 280 of the carrier and is,
therefore, a non-agent, independent contractor whose statements cannot be
admissions against the carrier.
Discovery. A compensation case involving issues broader than compensa-
tion law, and having a direct impact on trial procedure generally, was
decided by the San Antonio court of civil appeals. That court has deter-
mined that the failure of a plaintiff to amend answers to interrogatories and
disclose the name of an expert witness used at trial does not carry with it any
type of sanction. In Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Thomas28l the
carrier propounded interrogatories to the employee in July 1973, five months
after filing suit to set aside the Board's award. One interrogatory requested
the name and address of all doctors rendering treatment to the employee. A
second interrogatory asked if any expert would be called as a witness at trial
and, if so, requested the witness's name.28 2 Three doctors were named in
response to the first interrogatory, but the latter interrogatory was answered
in the negative. The answers were true when filed, but on October 22,
1973, the claimant retained Dr. A. E. Minyard to perform an orthopedic
examination and to testify at trial. The interrogatories were never amended.
The case went to trial on November 5, 1973, and on the second day of trial
the doctor was called to testify. The carrier filed a motion to withdraw its
announcement of ready and for a mistrial or, alternatively, to bar Dr.
Minyard's testimony. All motions were overrruled, although the trial court
"did excuse the jury and give defendant's attorney all the time that he
desired to make a background check on Dr. Minyard prior to cross-
examination. 28 3
The interrogatories were propounded pursuant to rule 168284 which was
amended by the supreme court, effective February 1, 1973, specifically to
allow inquiry into the identity of "each person whom he expects to call as
an expert witness at the trial and to state the subject matter concerning
which the expert is expected to testify."'285 This rule was also amended to
require a party to supplement the answers under certain specific circum-
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N, comment b, at 80 (1957).
280. Id. at 81.
281. 517 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
282. The exact wording of the interrogatories is quoted in the court's opinion. Id.
at 833-34.
283. Id. at 835. In view of the fact that the trial court overruled defendant's motion
for continuance this statement by the court of civil appeals appears to be a gross over-
statement of the actual facts.




stances. One such circumstance is when answers, though correct when
made, are not true and a failure to amend would be, in substance, a knowing
concealment. 286  The San Antonio court specifically recognized that the
employee should have supplemented his answers to the interrogatories after
the examination by Dr. Minyard in October, which examination was admit-
tedly for the sole purpose of using the doctor as an expert witness.
Nevertheless, the court held that since there are no specific sanctions set
forth in the rule providing a penalty for this type of situation, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing a mistrial or continuance and in
allowing the doctor to testify.28 7  In justifying this holding, the court
wrote:
It is seen that the medical evidence in this case was very fully de-
veloped in discovery proceedings. Plaintiff had been under the care
and treatment of ,two doctors approved by defendant, and defendant was
fully aware of plaintiff's physical condition. Dr. Minyard, who saw
plaintiff on only one occasion, did not bring any new medical evidence
into the case. He simply drew a different conclusion from the results
achieved by the treating physicians. Dr. Stool and Dr. Robinson . . .
testified that plaintiff had sustained a permanent partial incapacity of
ten percent and twenty-five percent respectively. On the other hand,
Dr. Minyard testified that, in his opinion, plaintiff was totally incapa-
citated as defined by the compensation law. There was little conflict
in the findings of the doctors; each just reached a different conclusion
from such findings. 288
The difficulty with the court's rationalization for this holding is that the
case appears to have been tried primarily on the extent and duration of the
claimant's incapacity. Obviously, the testimony of the various physicians
was vitally important in assessing the incapacity. Thus, the credibility of the
medical witnesses would be of primary importance. It is difficult at best to
cross-examine a physician who one knows will be called at trial. Untold
hours of preparation are required to research not only the possible testifying
history but the basis for his medical opinion. To do so when such a physician
is sitting on the witness stand, having been called as a surprise witness from
a county 250 miles away, as was Dr. Minyard, is virtually impossible. More-
over, this type of ambush can only be arranged by a plaintiff. A defendant
obviously cannot obtain a physical examination without the plaintiff's knowl-
edge, but a plaintiff can easily do so, as demonstrated in the instant case. This
is the classic "trial by ambush." The only protection a defendant has is to
rely on a fair and impartial enforcement of the rules as written. Absent such
enforcement, there is absolutely no protection from surprise expert witnesses.
It was originally thought that the amendment to rule 168 requiring
286. Id.
287. The court also noted: "Plaintiff's attorney is frank to admit that he was not
aware of the change in Rule 168, which requires the supplementing of answers." 517
S.W.2d at 834. This "frank" admission should not have influenced the outcome of this
case in light of the overwhelming publicity given the 1973 amendments. See, e.g., 35
TEX. B.J. 1037 (1972); Keith, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Summary and Discussion
of Amendments and Additions Effective February 1, 1973, 36 TEX. B.J. 401 (1973).
288. 517 S.W.2d at 835.
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supplemental answers to interrogatories effectively overruled the 1967 de-
cision in Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Mitchell289 in which the court held that
the plaintiff was under no duty to advise the defendant by supplemental
answers to interrogatories of additional doctors consulted by the plaintiff
subsequent to answering the interrogatories. 290  Apparently, the extremely
plain wording of the rule, thought to do away with trial by surprise and "to
liberalize and enfuse greater flexibility into the process of discovery,"'291
does not mean what it says. While it is true that no sanction specifically
directed to this problem is set out in the rule, it has been suggested by one
noted commentator that the result reached in the Thomas case is a step
backward into an era long thought past:
It is submitted that upon service of proper interrogatories, the re-
questing party is entitled to receive the identity and the subject matter
of each expert witness the opposing party expects to call as a witness
at the ,time such expert witness is initially employed. Because Rule 168
specifically imposes on the answering party the continuing duty to sup-
plement answers, a failure to supplement arguably constitutes a viola-
tion of an order imposed by law and would authorize the trial court
to employ the sanctions embodied in Rule 215a, including prohibiting
the party from utilizing the expert witness not identified, striking all or
a portion of the pleadings of a party, or abating the proceedings until
the interrogatories have been properly supplemented. Unless the sanc-
tions authorized under Rule 215a are available under these circum-
stances at the trial stage for failure to supplement, the purpose and in-
tendment of the amendment to the Rules is frustrated and ingenious
counsel may circumvent with relative impunity the obligation to furnish
information .... 292
The supreme court was obviously aware of this problem with respect to
rule 168 because the carrier's application for writ of error was refused, no
reversible error. In spite of the request by Justice Walker for "trial counsel
and trial judges to advise the supreme court of amendments that are needed
for purposes of clarification or for any other reasons,' 293 the supreme court
was apparently of the opinion that no amendment to rule 168 was necessary,
since this rule was not changed in the recent amendments to the rules
effective January 1, 1976.294 It is submitted, however, that the hiatus in
the present wording of rule 168 creates an "anomalous situation which
frustrates the very intent of the liberalization sought to be achieved"2 95 by
the 1973 amendments. Two additions are needed in order to make rule 168
effective: First, specific sanctions for failure to comply with the rule, and
289. 423 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ).
290. Sales, Discovery Under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 37 TEX. B.J. 39,
44 (1974).
291. Id.at4l.
292. Sales, Discovery Under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure-A Supplement, 38
TEX. B.J. 541, 545 (1975).
293. Walker, Discovery, 1973 Amendments to Texas Rules, 38 TEX. B.J. 27, 32
(1975).
294. Order Amending the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 38 TEX. B.J.
823 (1975).
295. Sales, supra note 292, at 545.
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second, a time limit in which the supplemental answers designating additional
experts must be filed before trial. This second suggestion is designed to
prevent the rather common practice of mailing supplemental answers to
opposing counsel on the Friday afternoon before a Monday trial.
Jury Argument. A classic illustration of the difficulty faced by a compensa-
tion carrier is Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Thurmond.296  A
substantial portion of the court's opinion deals with the improper and
prejudicial efforts of the employee's attorneys to sway the jury with bias,
prejudice, and sympathy. This situation is not, of course, unusual.297  In
Thurmond the court held that none of the arguments, nor the cumulative
effect thereof, presented reversible error. One of the primary holdings of
the Thurmond court, concerning the jury argument points of error, was that
the carrier's attorney should have objected to each and every argument, but
failed to do So.298 The carrier argued, however, that had it objected to all
of the objectionable remarks, many of which are summarized in the court's
opinion, the continuous objections would have simply compounded the bias
and prejudice and that instructions from the court would not have cured the
cumulative effect of the arguments. This is, of course, a practical, common-
sense argument based upon the practicalities of jury trial. The court
summarily rejected the argument, illustrating, once again, the difficulty in
attempting to reverse a jury verdict based primarily on trial conduct and jury
argument points of error.
Sufficiency of Evidence on Appeal. Cases during the survey period involv-
ing sufficiency of the evidence produced no surprises. Typically, most cases
were appealed by the insurance carriers from jury verdicts of substantial
value in favor of the employees. 299  Two cases involved an employee's
attack on jury findings of no accidental injury,300 but the jury verdict was
affirmed in both cases. One case, Thomas v. International Insurance
Co.,301 presented a situation rarely found in compensation cases. The case
was the second appeal by the employee. The first appeal302 was from a
jury verdict that the claimant had sustained no total incapacity and no
296. 527 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
297. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242, 266 S.W.2d
856 (1954); Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Bickham, 138 Tex. 128, 157 S.W.2d 356
(1942); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 510 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.) 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tanner v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 438 S.W.2d
395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
298. 527 S.W.2d at 193.
299. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Thurmond, 527 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming total and permanent ver-
dict); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Sprabery, 520 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1975, no writ) (affirming total and permanent verdict); Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Thomas, 517 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(affirming total and permanent verdict); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Williams,
516 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming total and
permanent verdict).
300. Marino v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 523 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); Washington v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 521 S.W.2d 313
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
301. 527 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




partial incapacity following the injury in question. The court of civil appeals
reversed and remanded for new trial, finding that the jury verdict was
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. On a second
trial, another jury found that the employee sustained an injury but suffered
no total incapacity and no partial incapacity but was entitled to $240.25 for
required medical care. The Waco court of civil appeals again reversed and
remanded the case for new trial. Again, all of these cases demonstrate the
correctness of the cogent observation of the Beaumont court of civil appeals
that it is impossible to reconcile all of the decisions of the courts of civil
appeals' rulings on sufficiency and great weight questions following total and
permanent disability findings.303  Two of these cases 30 4 also demonstrate
that the appellate courts are viewing evidence points on appeal with
increasing technicality, 305 again pointing up the fact that careful considera-
tion should be given to the preparation of evidence points of error. 06
303. Transport Ins. Co. v. Kennon, 485 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
304. Marino v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 523 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); Washington v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 521 S.W.2d 313
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
305. See, e.g., J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Razey, 426 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1968); Garza v.
Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. 1965); Hardy v. C.P.I. Sales, 511 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Garza, 390 S.W.2d
90 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
306. See generally O'Connor, Appealing Jury Findings, 12 Hous. L. REV. 65 (1974);
O'Connor, Evidence Points on Appeal, 37 TEx. B.J. 839 (1974).
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